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1Introduction
The Mohawk Valley, the only natural east-west water thoroughfare through the
Appalachian Plateau—stretching from Georgia to Maine—was an area of immense strategic
importance during the Revolutionary War.1 The strategic location of the Mohawk River led to
extraordinary efforts to defend it throughout the war. The Albany and Tryon County Militias,
New York Levies, Massachusetts Levies and various Continental Army units combined to help
protect the settlements and farmlands of Tryon County from the British and their Loyalist and
Indian allies. One key area of this defense was the construction of new forts, such as Fort
Dayton, and the reconstruction of old forts left in the Mohawk Valley after the French and Indian
War, including Fort Stanwix.2 These efforts saw success during 1777 when the Siege of Fort
Stanwix, led by Lt. Col. Barry St. Leger, failed. This led to the faulty mindset of Continental and
New York State officials that as long as Fort Stanwix held, the British could not capture the
Mohawk Valley and march to Albany. This mindset proved false through Fort Stanwix’s
inability to stop the Indian and Loyalist raids of 1780.
Fort Stanwix guarded the strategically important Oneida Carrying Place, the portage
between Oneida Lake and the head of navigation on the Mohawk River. The fort’s mission was
to block any invasion force that entered the Mohawk Valley, especially from the west. The
British General John Stanwix originally built the fort in 1758. The fort fell into disrepair after the
conclusion of the French and Indian War. The Continental Congress decided in 1776 to restore
1 M. Paul Keesler, Mohawk: Discovering the Valley of the Crystals (Utica, New York: North Country Books, 2008),
1.
2 Fort Stanwix was named for the British General John Stanwix, who built the fort in 1758. During the French and
Indian War, Fort Stanwix served as a base from which the successful attacks on Fort Frontenac in 1758, and Fort
Niagara in 1759, were launched. Stanwix also was the setting for the Fort Stanwix Treaty of 1768, between the
British and the Indians. Fort Stanwix was renamed Fort Schuyler by the Americans in 1776. I will use the name Fort
Stanwix unless a cited source does otherwise.
2Fort Stanwix on the recommendation of Rev. Samuel Kirkland3 and the Oneida Sachems.4 This
resulted in Colonel Elias Dayton’s Third New Jersey Regiment (3NJ) receiving orders to begin
reconstruction of the fort in the summer of 1776. While on a reconnaissance of the site, Captain
Joseph Bloomfield of the 3NJ recorded the following in his journal. “Took a View of the Ruins
of this Once strong and beautiful Fort . . . The Examination of this fortification gave me a better
Idea of the strength and Importance of a Fort than anything I ever before saw or Read.”5 After
the summer of 1776, many officials believed the Oneidas statements that the Mohawk Valley
could be defended by a refortified Fort Stanwix.6
Colonel Peter Gansevoort’s Third New York Regiment (3NY), successfully withstood
the British siege of Fort Stanwix in August 1777, despite the fort’s reconstruction being
unfinished. British Lieutenant Colonel Barry St. Leger’s two thousand men planned to advance
down the Mohawk Valley to Albany, but this plan was stopped and turned back at Stanwix. This
occurred after the Battle of Oriskany and sortie of Lt. Col. Marinus Willett on August 6 that
demoralized the Indians who took heavy casualties in both men and material. This, followed by
Maj. Gen. Benedict Arnold’s August 21 ruse, led to the end of the siege as the next day St.
Leger’s army quickly retreated in a near panic. The defeat of St. Leger’s expedition in August
1777 proved to be the only instance where Fort Stanwix worked as planned in its defensive role
during the American Revolution.
3 Reverend Samuel Kirkland was a Congregationalist missionary to the Oneida Tribe. He was originally from
Connecticut, and while training to be a missionary to the Indians was a classmate of Joseph Brant. Kirkland also
served as an American Indian agent and a Continental Army Chaplain during the Revolutionary War.
4 Gavin K. Watt, Rebellion in the Mohawk Valley: The St. Leger Expedition of 1777 (Toronto: The Dundurn Group,
2002), 33-36.
5 Joseph Bloomfield, “Friday, June 28, 1776,” in Citizen Soldier: The Revolutionary War Journal of Joseph
Bloomfield eds. Mark E. Lender and James Kirby Martin (Newark, New Jersey: New Jersey Historical Society,
1982), 65.
6 Watt, Rebellion in the Mohawk Valley, 33-36.
3In 1778, the Loyalist and Indian raids on the Mohawk Valley began early as outlying
settlements were destroyed in March and April. There were several large scale raids in 1778.
Brant destroyed Cobus Kill7 in May, Springfield and Andrew’s Town8 in July, and German Flats
in September. These devastating raids continued throughout the year, but the garrison of Fort
Stanwix was unable to assist the residents due to its distance from the settlements and the
unpredictability of the raiding parties. The Cherry Valley Massacre of November 11, 1778, led
by Loyalist Captain Walter Butler, devastated the town. On November 6, five days prior to this
attack, Colonel Ichabod Alden of the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment received a dispatch from
Fort Stanwix warning of the coming raid.9 Alden minimized the importance of this intelligence,
and this decision led to the destruction of Cherry Valley.
In retaliation for the previous years’ raids, Gen. Washington decided in 1779 to send four
thousand Continentals under Maj. Gen. John Sullivan and Brig. Gen. James Clinton to destroy
the Iroquois’ villages. Prior to this campaign, Colonel Goose Van Schaick of the First New York
Regiment (1NY) left Fort Stanwix in April 1779 with 558 men to destroy the Onondaga villages.
Van Schaick accomplished this mission without losing a man. He also captured several
Onondagas while removing a threat from the rear of the Sullivan campaign. The Clinton-Sullivan
Campaign of August and September 1779 was a success and a failure. It destroyed more than 40
towns with crops and orchards but did not kill or capture many Indians. Major Jeremiah Fogg
stated after the end of the campaign “The nests are destroyed, but the birds are still on the
7 Cobus Kill is modern Cobleskill, New York.
8 Andrew’s Town was also called Andrustown. After Brant’s raid in July 1778 this settlement ceased to exist and
unlike most destroyed settlements, was never rebuilt.
9 Colonel Peter Gansevoort to Colonel Ichabod Alden, November 6, 1778, in Barbara Graymont, The Iroquois in the
American Revolution (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1972), 185-186.
4wing.”10 The destruction of the Iroquois villages in 1779 had the opposite effect as planned. One
goal was to force them into neutrality but the campaign instead drove them deeper into alliance
with the British.11
In 1780, the Loyalist and Indian raids on the Mohawk and Schoharie valleys began early
with small raids that destroyed abandoned settlements. Sir John Johnson and Joseph Brant struck
in May, August, and October 1780. All of these attacks entered the frontiers from different
directions with near impunity. Sir John Johnson’s May raid on Caughnawaga descended on the
Mohawk Valley from the north, thus avoiding Stanwix. Joseph Brant’s July-August raid on the
Oneidas and the Canajoharie District advanced from the south and west. In the October raid led
by Johnson, the loyalist and Indian force marched south and east from Fort Oswego to the Upper
Fort on the Schoharie. Johnson did this deliberately in order to avoid detection. Despite
Johnson’s precautions, Fort Stanwix knew of his approach to the Schoharie. This raid devastated
the agricultural output of Tryon County, preventing its use by the Continental Army.
The New York Regiments disliked the duty of serving at Fort Stanwix.  There were
multiple reasons for this including boredom, lack of provisions, and the danger from Indian
attacks outside of the fort. The distance of Fort Stanwix from the Continental supply depots at
Albany, Fishkill, and West Point, helped make the fort difficult to keep properly supplied.
Washington honored requests to supply the fort at the expense of provisions for his own army, at
times sending all the food he had on hand. On May 5, 1781, Washington wrote, “Alarmed at the
critical situation of the Garrison of Fort Schuyler, . . .” 12 due to the continued deficiencies in
10 Major Jeremiah Fogg, “September 30, 1779,” in Frederick Cook, Journals of the Military Expedition of Major
General John Sullivan Against the Six Nations of Indians in 1779 with Records of Centennial Celebrations (Auburn,
New York: Knapp, Peck & Thomson Printers, 1887), 132 .
11 Gavin K. Watt, The Burning of the Valleys: Daring Raids from Canada Against the New York Frontier in the Fall
of 1780 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997), 60-66.
12 General George Washington to Brigadier General James Clinton, May 5, 1781, in John C. Fitzpatrick, The
Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, vol. 22 (Washington D.C.: Government
5provisions at the post, “ordered . . . 50 Barrels of Meat and the same quantity of flour, to be . . .
thrown into that Garrison, but the Commissary reports there are but 34 Bbs of Meat in store. I
have directed this number to be sent. . .”13 He went on to order Brig. Gen. James Clinton to make
sure these supplies went directly to Fort Stanwix due to the army’s not knowing “. . . from
whence the supplies of tomorrow are to be derived, no inferior object could have justified the
Measure of stripping this Army of its last Mouthful. . . .”14 By 1780 Fort Stanwix proved to be a
drain on both provisions and manpower from the Continental Army.
Several authors have examined the Continental Army’s supply problems and the
logistical, financial, and political issues leading to the shortages of provisions throughout the
American Revolution. Authors such as Erna Risch,15 E. Wayne Carp,16 John Shy,17 and James A
Huston18 have discussed the reasons for and the effects of the supply problems in the Continental
Army. These authors all give excellent information on the development of the Continental Army
Staff Departments and the men who worked tirelessly to keep the army supplied. Although these
authors did not examine the effects of the army-wide supply difficulties on Fort Stanwix, these
works offer context to the difficulties faced by the army in supplying Stanwix.
Erna Risch in Supplying Washington’s Army (1981) describes how the army under Gen.
Washington received its supplies in the field. Risch examines the Quartermaster’s, Commissary,
Printing Office, 1931-1944), 35-36. http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/ot2www-
washington?specfile=/texts/english/washington/fitzpatrick/search/gw.o2w&act=surround&offset=27274177&tag=
Writings+of+Washington,+Vol.+22:+To+BRIGADIER+GENERAL+JAMES+CLINTON&query=Fort +Schuyler&i
d=gw220046
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Erna Risch, Supplying Washington’s Army (Washington, D. C.: Center of Military History, United States Army,
1981).
16 E. Wayne Carp, To Starve the Army at Pleasure: Continental Army Administration and American Political
Culture 1775-1783 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1984).
17 John Shy, “Logistical Crisis and the American Revolution: A Hypothesis,” in Feeding Mars: Logistics in Modern
Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present Edited by John A. Lynn (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993).
18 James A. Huston, Logistics of Liberty: American Services of Supply in the Revolutionary War and After (Newark,
Delaware: University of Delaware Press, 1991).
6Clothing, Ordinance, and Hospital Departments. She details the supply programs initiated by
Congress throughout the war and their overall effectiveness in feeding the army. Risch “seeks to
provide answers as to how the main Continental army, the army directly under General George
Washington’s control, was maintained in the field for eight years.”19 Her examination of these
issues, despite only discussing the army immediately under the command of Gen. Washington,
highlights the difficulties in keeping the Continental army properly supplied.
Risch examines the development of the Quartermaster and Commissary Departments and
the difficulties they faced in service to the army. Some major problems were poor finances,
corruption, and a lack of reliable transportation due to deficiencies in teams, wagons, and drivers.
The states’ agricultural abilities produced more than enough food, but most of the time did not
have the means or the governmental power to deliver it.20 This led to Congress’ complete
overhaul of the Commissary Department through the 1780 Select Supply System.21 This failed
due to the states’ inability to fill the supply quotas levied by Congress. While Risch does not
mention Fort Stanwix’s constant drain on Washington’s provisions in her writing, this work is
important due to its description of the supply problems faced by the army of Gen. George
Washington.
E. Wayne Carp, in To Starve the Army at Pleasure: Continental Army Administration
and American Political Culture, 1775-1783, (1984) discusses the effect of the local, state, and
national political culture on the efforts to gather the necessary supplies for the Continental Army.
Carp describes the political issues faced in supplying the army due to state and local backlash
against the centralized political power necessary for the Continental Congress to properly
19 Erna Risch, Supplying Washington’s Army, 3.
20 Ibid., 5.
21 This program instituted by the Continental Congress in 1780 was known as the Select Supply System. Another
title used for this program was the Specific Supply System.  Unless a source does otherwise, I will refer to this
program as the Select Supply System.
7provision the army.22 Carp explores how early American political culture shaped Americans’
perception of the army and how this affected the procurement of army supplies. He details the
efforts of the Continental Congress to reform the army supply departments between 1777 and
1781, especially the Select Supply System of 1780.
Carp explores the severe difficulties faced not only by the army administration, but also
the local, state, and national governments in providing the necessary supplies for the army. He
adds an interesting viewpoint to the discussion of these difficulties, namely that the economic,
logistical, and personnel issues that led to the supply problems originated in early American
political culture. These issues developed due to Americans’ fear of a powerful standing army and
centralized government. He examines how these issues worsened the supply problems in the
Continental army, especially late in the war. Carp’s discussion of American political culture and
its influence on the Continental Army’s supply issues illustrates the background of local and
state political issues that worsened the problems faced in resupplying Fort Stanwix with adequate
provisions.
In “Logistical Crisis and the American Revolution: A Hypothesis,” (1993) John Shy
discusses the supply problems through the light of near complete lack of efficient transportation
to bring supplies to the army. He explains that there was no real shortage of supplies, provisions,
or men of military age in America during the war. Shy argues that throughout the war there was
a major shortage in transportation and the skilled manpower necessary to keep the transportation
system running.23 One reason he gave was the shortage of safe roadways. This was due to the
best roadways being along waterways, or near coastal areas, where the supply trains could be
22 E. Wayne Carp, To Starve the Army at Pleasure, 14-15.
23 John Shy, “Logistical Crisis and the American Revolution: A Hypothesis,” in Feeding Mars, 163.
8harassed by British or loyalist raiding parties. The shipping and transportation problems helped
to keep the Continental Army constantly short on provisions and forage.
He explores Congress’ formation of the Specific Supply System in 1780, under which the
states were to provide for their own regiments, and any other Continental troops based in their
state. This led to the army’s use of an impressment policy to acquire supplies and transportation
from local farmers for payment promised at a future date. Impressment was an unpopular policy
among the vast majority of army officers and the public and led many farmers to hide their crops
and livestock. Shy argues that despite the many logistical mistakes that occurred during the war,
no one person or group of people was entirely to blame for the army’s supply problems. He
asserts that the supply problems in America were most likely inevitable due to the deficiencies in
transportation and skilled manpower. This lack of safe transportation, forage, and skilled
workmen severely affected the resupply of Fort Stanwix. While most supplies could be loaded
on bateaux and sent up the Mohawk River to Stanwix, a large amount of provisions still went
west on the “King’s Highway.”
In Logistics of Liberty: American Services of Supply in the Revolutionary War and After
(1991) James A. Huston discusses the logistical problems the nation faced in keeping the
Continental Army supplied, especially while on campaign. He details the efforts of the
Continental Congress and Army to procure arms, ammunition, clothing, and food. Congress
accomplished this objective through the use of imports, wartime captures, and domestic
production. He examines the nation’s financial struggles and how these led to the initiation of the
Specific Supply System in 1780. This system failed for many reasons, one being the inability
and/or unwillingness of the states to raise the taxes and quotas necessary to keep the army
9supplied.24 These problems in gathering supplies grew worse when combined with the lack of
safe and efficient transportation to carry them to the army.
Huston states the effects of the lack of finances to purchase the supplies and
transportation to bring them to the army. He argues that the Continental Army’s nearly total
reliance on land transport instead of water transportation occurred due to the British Navy’s
control of the sea and many navigable waterways. Although Huston does not examine the effects
of the nation’s logistical and transportation problems on the efforts to keep Fort Stanwix
supplied, these two problems severely affected the tenability of the fort especially after the 1780
raids.
The above authors discuss the multi-faceted supply problems faced by the Continental
Army throughout the American Revolution. A common theme that all of these writers examine is
the Select Supply System of 1780. They detail the collapse of this system through the states’
inability to send sufficient supplies to the army. Their works agree that the army’s supply
problem stemmed from the lack of safe and reliable transportation, the national financial
problems, and the underlying American political culture. Although all of these authors agree that
these factors played a role in the collapse of the supply system, each one emphasizes a specific
factor as the key issue. Erna Risch believes that the army’s supply and transportation problems
grew out of the financial problems that occurred due to the worthless Continental paper currency.
John Shy asserts that the financial problems stemmed from the lack of safe and reliable
transportation, skilled laborers, and drivers for the available transports. While E. Wayne Carp
argues that the financial and transportation issues that led to the supply breakdown branched out
of the American political culture, where it seemed at times that Americans would rather lose the
war than give Congress the necessary power to win the war.
24 James A. Huston, Logistics of Liberty, 139.
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The above mentioned reasons for the Continental Army’s supply problems limited the
army’s and New York’s ability to keep Fort Stanwix properly provisioned. The transportation,
economic, and political issues hamstrung the efforts to supply Fort Stanwix throughout the war.
Despite this, the fort remained a somewhat viable position due to its strategic location for
gathering intelligence and its role in keeping U.S.-Oneida relations on good footing. However, a
combination of Congress’ Select Supply System and devastating Indian and Loyalist raids in
1780 ensured that Stanwix became untenable.
Through the formation of the Select Supply System in 1780, the Continental Congress
levied state quotas for soldiers, supplies, and money for the army. This led to most (Georgia did
not receive a quota) of the states’ inability to fulfill their supply quotas. In New York, the
element that ensured its failure was the 1780 Loyalist and Indian Raids on the Mohawk and
Schoharie Valleys. These major raids occurred in May, August, and October and completely
destroyed that year’s grain harvests from Tryon County. This led to New York’s inability to fill
its supply quotas for the army and the state’s forts, including Fort Stanwix.
Several authors have discussed the American Revolution in the Mohawk Valley. The
writings on this subject can be divided into two main periods: the 1830s through 1910s and after
1970. The earlier authors give excellent discussions on the entirety of the Revolutionary War in
the Mohawk Valley, with lengthy sections on the 1780 raids. The more recent works tend to
cover specialized topics that focus on the specific campaigns. These authors all describe the
major events that occurred at Fort Stanwix, yet do not show the untenable situation of the fort
after the 1780 raids. The impotence of Stanwix to thwart these invasions demonstrated that the
garrison could not adequately defend the Mohawk Valley.
11
Several historians, between the mid nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, detailed the
events that occurred in the Mohawk Valley and the supply and operational issues faced by the
garrisons of Fort Stanwix. These early authors relied upon interviews of surviving veterans,
veterans’ relatives, and archived collections of documents. William W. Campbell, in Annals of
Tryon County (1831),25 examined the events that occurred in Tryon County and how these
affected the local residents who fought to defend their homes and families. Campbell discussed
the service of Fort Stanwix and how the resupply problems affected the fort’s effectiveness
throughout the war. He described Stanwix’s isolated position, and how that contributed to its
unsuccessful defense of the Mohawk Valley. William Leete Stone wrote a two volume work that
covered the history of the Mohawk Valley between 1742 and 1815. His first volume, Life of
Joseph Brant (1838),26 covered the years between 1742 and 1779, while his second, Border
Wars (1843),27 detailed the years from 1779 through 1815. He examined the chronic deficiencies
of provisions due to the difficulties faced in keeping Fort Stanwix supplied.
F. W. Beers, in History of Montgomery and Fulton Counties, NY (1878),28 highlighted the
history of the two counties, from the early Indian villages prior to European settlement, through
the end of the U. S. Civil War in 1865. In a large section of his book, Beers examined the
American Revolution in the Mohawk Valley. He detailed the major problems faced in supplying
all of the forts along the Mohawk Valley, with Fort Stanwix being the most difficult due to its
25 William W. Campbell, Annals of Tryon County: Or, the Border Warfare of New York During the Revolution (New
York: J & J Harper, 1831).
26 William Leete Stone, Life of Joseph Brant-Thayendanegea: Including the Border Wars of the American
Revolution and Sketches of the Indian Campaigns of Generals Harmar, St. Clair, and Wayne vol. 1 (New York:
George Dearborn and Co., 1838).
27 William Leete Stone, Border Wars of the American Revolution vol. 2 (New York: A. L. Fowle, 1900) (originally
published in 1843).
28 F. W. Beers & Co., History of Montgomery and Fulton Counties, N.Y.: With Illustrations Descriptive of Scenery,
Private Residences, Public Buildings, Fine Blocks, and Important Manufactories, from Original Sketches by Artists
of the Highest Ability; and Portraits of Old Pioneers and Prominent Residents (New York: George MacNamara
Printer, 1878).
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distance from the settlements. Nelson Greene, in The Story of Old Fort Plain and the Middle
Mohawk Valley (1915),29 discussed the history of the Mohawk Valley between the years 1609
and 1914. He divided the history of the Mohawk Valley into four parts, of which the
Revolutionary Period, lasting from 1772-1783, is the second. Greene extensively detailed the
American Revolution in the Mohawk Valley and the effect of the fighting on the local populace.
He recorded the inability of Fort Stanwix to completely defend the frontier and the difficulty of
keeping the fort in provisions because of the distance and the risk of enemy attack. He also
described the necessity to abandon Fort Stanwix in May of 1781, due to the damage that resulted
from a flood and a fire.
These early historical writings on the American Revolution in the Mohawk Valley are
important to the study of how Fort Stanwix became a liability to the Continental Army. These
authors all mention the problems faced in keeping the fort supplied. They described the distance
and the threat of enemy attack as reasons for the problems in keeping the fort provisioned. While
these writers all mention the supply issues and the successful defense against Lt. Col. Barry St.
Leger’s siege in 1777, with the exception of Campbell, they do not mention the failure of Fort
Stanwix to properly defend the Mohawk Valley from future Indian and Loyalist raids.
The historical works written since the 1970s by authors such as Barbara Graymont,30
Gavin K. Watt,313233 Ken D. Johnson,34 and William R. Nester35 tend to focus more on specific
29 Nelson Greene, The Story of Old Fort Plain and the Middle Mohawk Valley (Fort Plain, New York: O’Connor
Brothers, 1915).
30 Barbara Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press,
1972).
31 Gavin K. Watt, Rebellion in the Mohawk Valley: The St. Leger Expedition of 1777 (Toronto: The Dundurn Group,
2002).
32 Gavin K. Watt, The Burning of the Valleys: Daring Raids from Canada Against the New York Frontier in the Fall
of 1780 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997).
33 Gavin K. Watt, A Dirty, Trifling, Piece of Business, Volume 1: The Revolutionary War as Waged from Canada in
1781 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2009).
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people groups, campaigns, and places rather than on the Revolution in the Mohawk Valley as a
whole. The modern writers all discuss the events involving Fort Stanwix. Despite this, these
works do not consistently show how Stanwix became untenable after the 1780 raids on the
Schoharie and Mohawk Valleys.
Barbara Graymont, in The Iroquois in the American Revolution (1972),36 examines the
role of the Iroquois Confederacy in the war. During the war, the British received the aid of the
Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, and Mohawk Tribes. The majority of the Oneida and Tuscarora
allied with the Patriots, causing an irrevocable split in the Iroquois Confederacy. The Iroquois
participated in most, if not all of the battles and raids that devastated the New York frontiers
between 1777 and 1782. Graymont describes how the Iroquois’ actions affected Fort Stanwix
during the war. She does this through her discussions of the 1777 siege, the always present
Indian raiding parties, and Joseph Brant’s July 1780 attack on the Oneida villages. Graymont
details how the long terms of service of the New York regiments at Fort Stanwix, without facing
actual large scale combat, affected the discipline and morale of the men in garrison at the fort.37
Gavin K. Watt, in The Burning of the Valleys (1997),38 examines the major raids on the
New York frontiers in 1780. These raids were led by Sir John Johnson and Joseph Brant against
the Mohawk and Schoharie Valleys. Watt explores the attempts to stop the raids by the New
York and Massachusetts Levies and the local militias. These raids struck the frontier in May,
July, August, and October after the harvest, and devastated agricultural production. Watt
describes the role of Fort Stanwix in the October raid, a role primarily limited to alerting Albany
34 Ken D. Johnson, The Bloodied Mohawk: The American Revolution in the Words of Fort Plank’s Defenders and
Other Mohawk Valley Partisans (Rockland, Maine: Picton Press, 2000).
35 William R. Nester, The Frontier War for American Independence (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole
Books, 2004).
36 Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution.
37 Ibid., 174-177.
38 Watt, The Burning of the Valleys.
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to the incoming raid. The fort later sent a party to try and destroy Johnson’s boats to halt his
retreat. He also discusses the shortages of provisions at Fort Stanwix both prior to, and after the
1780 raids.
Watt wrote two other books that discuss Fort Stanwix’s defense of the Mohawk Valley.
In Rebellion in the Mohawk Valley (2002),39 he details the events that occurred in the Mohawk
Valley between 1775 and 1777. He focuses on the restoration of Fort Stanwix in 1776-1777 and
its role in the defense of the frontier. He examines the 1777 campaign of British Lieutenant
Colonel Barry St. Leger that culminated in his failed August siege of Fort Stanwix. By
successfully thwarting St. Leger’s campaign to march down the Mohawk Valley to Albany and
assist Lieutenant General John Burgoyne’s army, Fort Stanwix accomplished its only true
defensive success during the American Revolution. Watt, in A Dirty, Trifling, Piece of Business
(2009),40 discusses the events that occurred in the Mohawk Valley during 1781. In this, he
examines the situation at Fort Stanwix during the closing months of its service from January
through June 1781. He details the major personnel issues within the garrison prior to the fort’s
destruction through a flood and fire in mid-May. He also explores the moving of the fort’s
garrison to Fort Herkimer in May and June 1781.
Ken D. Johnson, in The Bloodied Mohawk (2000),41 examines the history and disputed
location of Fort Plank in the Mohawk Valley. He discusses the May, August, and October 1780
raids led by Sir John Johnson and Brant. Johnson details the ruse utilized by Brant that forced the
militia of the Canajoharie District to guard a supply train to Fort Stanwix. He describes the
October raid of Sir John Johnson that destroyed the Schoharie and Mohawk Valley settlements
including Stone Arabia. He also examines the battles of Stone Arabia and Klock’s Field in which
39 Watt, Rebellion in the Mohawk Valley.
40 Watt, A Dirty, Trifling, Piece of Business.
41 Ken D. Johnson, The Bloodied Mohawk.
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the Americans tried to stop the raiders. Johnson discussed the role played by Fort Plank
throughout the Revolutionary War as a base for both the Tryon County Militia, and various
Continental Army regiments. Johnson assesses the service of several Continental units that
served in Fort Stanwix, as many garrisoned Fort Plank either prior to or after their duty at
Stanwix. He describes the supply difficulties of 1780, and Fort Plank’s service as a Continental
Army supply depot. During which, the fort dealt with the supplies for Fort Stanwix as the
convoys passed through while en route to Stanwix from Albany.
William R. Nester, in The Frontier War for American Independence (2004),42 examines
the Revolutionary Era on the American frontier between 1763 and 1783. Nester writes on the
frontier war’s importance to the outcome of the Revolution, a subject not extensively discussed
in other works on the American Revolution.43 He describes the results of the campaigns waged
by the British and their Loyalist and Indian allies against the Mohawk Valley in 1777, 1778, and
1780-82. He discusses the American campaign in 1779 against the Iroquois nations in western
New York as well. Nester argues that the repulse of British Brigadier General44 Barry St. Leger’s
1777 expedition at Fort Stanwix and Oriskany was one of the three major frontier events which
helped the Americans win the war.45 He explores Johnson’s May and October raids, as well as
Brant’s incursion of late July and early August 1780, describing the destruction these attacks
unleashed on the Mohawk Valley. He details Fort Stanwix’s role in guarding the Mohawk
Valley, exploring the fort’s failure to achieve this prior to its abandonment in 1781. He
42 William R. Nester, The Frontier War for American Independence.
43 Ibid., 3.
44 During the 1777 campaign, British Lieutenant Colonel Barry St. Leger received official permission to serve as
acting Brigadier General due to the large size of the force he commanded. Despite this, St. Leger officially remained
a Lt. Col. throughout this campaign. Unless a cited source states otherwise, I will refer to St. Leger by his official
rank of Lieutenant Colonel.
45 Nester, The Frontier War for American Independence, 2.
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concludes that with the abandonment of Fort Stanwix the New York frontier receded to Fort
Herkimer, and that frontier posts in general were unable to thwart enemy raids.46
The post-1970 works written on the American Revolution in the Mohawk Valley help to
highlight the difficult supply and manpower situation at Fort Stanwix throughout the war. These
authors utilized the available primary sources, most of which are in county, state, national, or
university archive collections. While the vast majority of these works were written on subjects
other than the untenability of Fort Stanwix, they all discussed the hazards and problems faced at
the position. While these works examine the severe supply and manpower issues at Fort Stanwix,
none make the connection between these problems and the fort’s becoming an overall liability to
the Continental Army.
Fort Stanwix’s inability to properly defend the New York Frontiers stemmed from the
fort’s isolation from the settlements. This isolation made it dangerous for the men to leave the
fort in small groups. These problems combined to make garrison duty at Fort Stanwix a task
hated by the men serving there. These issues also led to several attempted mutinies in the ranks
of the 1NY at Stanwix in 1779 and 1780. In the fall of 1780, Colonel William Malcom47 asked
permission to move the fort’s garrison 30 miles east to Fort Herkimer. Both Washington and
New York State officials denied Malcom’s request to abandon Fort Stanwix due to the belief that
the fort needed to be manned in order to keep the Mohawk Valley protected.
The resolution of this issue came about in May 1781 when two-thirds of Fort Stanwix’s
sod walls washed away in torrential rains and a suspicious fire destroyed the barracks. These
disasters combined to force the post’s evacuation in May and June of 1781. In the summer and
fall of 1781, Loyalist and Indian forces continued to attack Tryon County from all directions,
46 Nester, The Frontier War for American Independence, 304.
47 Colonel William Malcom served as Commander of the Northern Department during the fall of 1780.
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when they easily could have marched along the banks of the Mohawk River. This illustrated the
post-1777 British change in strategy that the Continental Army and New York State repeatedly
missed. Throughout the period of 1777-1781, the Loyalists and Indians proved time and time
again, especially during the 1780 raids, that they could enter the area with impunity from any
direction they pleased, without passing Fort Stanwix. The inability to properly defend the valleys
from the 1780 raids, coupled with the difficulties in maintaining the post, demonstrated how Fort
Stanwix became a liability to the Continental Army.
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Chapter One:
Fort Stanwix’s Early Success and the Formation of a Failed Mindset
In 1776 the Oneida Indians pointed out to the Continental Congress that a British
invasion of the Mohawk Valley could be stopped by a refortified Fort Stanwix.48 The
reconstruction of the post led to the formation of a faulty mindset among the New York State
government and many Continental Army officers that Fort Stanwix was the key to the defense of
the Mohawk Valley. Stanwix, positioned to block an invasion from the west down the Mohawk
River, successfully defended Tryon County against the expedition of British Lt. Col. Barry St.
Leger in August 1777. This success only served to strengthen the thinking of Stanwix as the key
to the defense of the frontier. Although the British strategy changed in 1778 from attempting to
conquer Tryon County, to the destruction of the valley’s agricultural output through Loyalist and
Indian raiding parties, the Americans continued to believe that holding Fort Stanwix meant
American control of the frontier. The formation of this faulty strategy in 1776 and 1777, in light
of the changes in the British plans in 1778, set the foundation for major supply, manpower, and
isolation issues faced by soldiers at Fort Stanwix until its abandonment in 1781.
Throughout 1775 and early 1776 there were severe tensions along the Mohawk Valley
between the local Patriots and Loyalists. In June 1775, many prominent loyalists fled Tryon
County including Colonel Guy Johnson, with 250 employees, friends and family.49 After leaving
the valley, Col. Johnson50 and Col. Daniel Claus held conferences with the Indians at Fort
Oswego and Montreal in 1775 to encourage them to go on the warpath for the crown. Sir John
48 The Oneida tribe sent this request to Congress in the form of a letter written by their missionary Reverend Samuel
Kirkland.
49 Gavin K. Watt, Rebellion in the Mohawk Valley, 21-23.
50 Colonel Guy Johnson replaced his uncle and father-in-law, Sir William Johnson, as the Superintendent of Indian
Affairs after Sir William’s death in 1774.
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Johnson51 also fled from the Mohawk Valley in May 1776 after hearing that a large force of
Continentals and militia was en route to arrest him and his associates.52 Both Sir John and Col.
Guy Johnson began planning Loyalist expeditions to retake the Mohawk Valley.
After receiving the Oneidas’ request to restore Fort Stanwix, the Continental Congress
ordered the Third New Jersey Regiment (3NJ) to rebuild the fort. At this time, the 3NJ with
elements of the Fourth New York Regiment (4NY), and the Tryon County Militia, were
constructing Fort Dayton at German Flats.53 On July 11, 1776, Captain Joseph Bloomfield
described his regiment’s preparations to march to Fort Stanwix.54 He recorded the arrival of “a
Company of Artillery this Evening so far on their way to Fort Stanwix” and that “all our
Regiment excepting my Company are ordered to get in Readiness to March tomorrow.”55 The
3NJ garrisoned Fort Stanwix until October when they received orders to march to Fort
Ticonderoga. When the 3NJ left Stanwix, the post was thought to be defensible against small
arms and light artillery.
In mid-August 1776, Maj. Gen. Philip Schuyler convened a conference with the Indians
at German Flats. The goal of this meeting, attended by more than two thousand natives, was to
keep the Iroquois neutral in the American Revolution. This meeting was temporarily successful,
although the roots of future problems did appear as there was significant mistrust between the
two groups. One of these issues was that the Iroquois, except for the Oneida who invited them,
considered the Continentals at Fort Stanwix to be trespassing on Indian Territory.56 Throughout
51 Sir John Johnson, also a Colonel, was the eldest legitimate son and the heir of Sir William Johnson.
52 Mary Beacock Fryer, King’s Men: The Soldier Founders of Ontario (Toronto: Dundurn Press Limited, 1980), 69-
72.
53 Watt, Rebellion in the Mohawk Valley, 33-36.
54 Joseph Bloomfield, “July 11, 1776 Journal Entry,” in Citizen Soldier, 68.
55 Ibid.
56 William R. Nester, The Frontier War of American Independence, 104-105.
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the summer and fall of 1776, rumors of a Loyalist and Indian invasion of the Mohawk Valley ran
rampant, keeping Fort Stanwix and the frontier settlements on high alert. Thomas Spencer wrote
News from Onondaga that there are seven hundred Indians and whites at Oswegatchie
that will be at Oswego this day...they are to come first to Stone Arabia and then go
down...and that there are particular parties designed to take Major Fonda and Colonel
Herkimer...They make five roads as they come through the woods. NB. The party
designed for Oswego are commanded by Walter Butler. I am at a loss whether they are
yet arrived at Oswego or not. Great numbers will soon arrive after the seven hundred at
Oswego.57
The British and their allies were not the only ones to effectively use rumors in order to
confuse the enemy. Gen. Schuyler spread a rumor through the Iroquois that, according to the
British Captain Richard Lernoult, led to the Indians’ claiming that “six thousand rebels were to
take post at Oswego.”58 Lernoult described Gen. Schuyler as “very industrious in spreading such
reports which alarm the Six Nations greatly.”59 He also worried that if the Continental Army did
capture Fort Oswego, it would either keep the Indians neutral, or they would join with the
Americans.60
Throughout 1775 and 1776, both of the Johnsons lobbied extensively for an immediate
invasion of the Mohawk Valley from Fort Oswego. During this time, Sir John Johnson received
permission to raise a Loyalist regiment that he named the King’s Royal Regiment of New York61
or Johnson’s Greens. This regiment played a major role in the future events in the Mohawk and
Schoharie Valleys. Lieutenant General John Burgoyne, after hearing of the expected success of a
Mohawk Valley invasion in 1776 from both Johnsons, added it to his plan titled, “Thoughts for
57 Thomas Spencer to Colonel Elias Dayton, September 4, 1776, in American Archives: Fifth Series, Containing a
Documentary History of the United States of America, from the Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776, to the
Definitive Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, September 3, 1783 vol. 2 ed. Peter Force (Washington D.C.: M. St.
Clair Clarke and Peter Force, 1837), 247-248.
58 Captain Richard Lernoult to Captain-General Guy Carleton, April 28, 1777, in Watt, Rebellion in the Mohawk
Valley, 60.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 The King’s Royal Regiment of New York was called Johnson’s Greens and the Royal Yorkers. Unless called
otherwise in a quotation, I will refer to the unit as Johnson’s Greens.
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conducting the War from the Side of Canada.”62 This plan called for a three-pronged invasion of
New York, which, if successful, would divide the colonies in two. Burgoyne chose Lt. Col.
Barry St. Leger63 to lead the wing that would march from Fort Oswego down the Mohawk
Valley to Albany. St. Leger was given 675 soldiers, not counting Indians and Canadians, to man
his expedition.64 St. Leger’s expedition would begin its trek toward the Mohawk Valley on June
26, 1777, and arrived at Buck Island on July 8.
In April 1777, Schuyler, commander of the Northern Department of the Continental
Army in Albany, ordered the Third New York (3NY) under Col. Peter Gansevoort and Lt. Col.
Marinus Willett, to finish the restoration of Fort Stanwix into fighting condition and to serve as
its garrison. While some of the 3NY arrived in mid April, Gansevoort and much of his regiment
arrived on May 3.65 By late June Schuyler had received information on the coming invasion.
James Deane reported that two Indians, “lately from Canada. . . reported that Sir John Johnson
would be at Oswego with a large body of Indians the first of July, where he would be joined by
Butler and his party from Niagara, from whence they were to attack Fort Schuyler; and that the
regular troops were at the same time to make an attack upon Ticonderoga.”66 Schuyler relayed
this information to Gansevoort at Fort Stanwix. The 3NY continued working on the fort’s
construction despite the great risk of deadly Indian and Loyalist attacks.
On July 3 British Indian Department Captain John Deserontyon, a Mohawk Indian, and
fellow Department Captain John Hare led a raiding party of Indians that captured five members
62 Watt, Rebellion in the Mohawk Valley, 49.
63 During this campaign, Lt. Col. St. Leger received the rank of acting Brigadier General due to the large size of his
force.
64 Lord George Germain to Captain-General Guy Carleton, March 26, 1777, in William A. Smy, The Butler Papers:
Documents Relating to Colonel John Butler and His Corps of Rangers, 1711-1977, vol. BR1775 (Victoria, British
Columbia: Not Published, 1994), 26.
65 William Colbrath, “April 17, and May 3, 1777, Journal Entries,” in Days of Siege: A Journal of the Siege of Fort
Stanwix in 1777 ed. Larry Lowenthal (New York: Eastern Acorn Press, 1983), 11.
66 James Deane to Major General Philip Schuyler, June 25, 1777, in Papers of the Continental Congress, Microfilm
Group M247, Roll 173:212. http://www.footnote.com/image/#435682 pages 201-202. (accessed October 7, 2010).
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of a Continental work party from Stanwix.67 This raid occurred on the orders of Col. Claus of the
British Indian Department in order to obtain accurate information on Stanwix and its garrison.
He discovered from the prisoners that, “The old Fort which is a regular Square, and garrisoned
by upwards of 600 Men, the Repairs far advanced, and the Rebels expecting us, and were well
acquainted with our Strength and Rout [sic].”68 After receiving this intelligence from Claus, St.
Leger “owned that if they intended to defend themselves at that Fort, our Artillery were not
sufficient to take it, however he said that he was determined to get the Truth of these Fellows.”69
Regardless of these developments, St. Leger decided to stay on course rather than wait for his
heavy artillery and the rest of his German troops. This decision stemmed from his assumption
that the “Alert,” an advanced force of Indians, Regulars and Loyalists, would quickly capture
Fort Stanwix.70
St. Leger’s approach toward Fort Stanwix led Schuyler to send word to Brig. Gen.
Nicholas Herkimer of the Tryon County Militia, to have his men ready to support Gansevoort at
the fort. The morale of the militia was very low after hearing the reports of St. Leger’s advancing
force. Herkimer told Schuyler that “whole numbers of men in each district are so far
discouraged, that they think it worthless to fight, and will not obey orders for battle, if the
country is not in time succored with at least 1,500 Continental troops.”71 On July 17 the Tryon
County Committee of Safety met with the Oneida sachem Thomas Spencer.72 Spencer told the
committee that Loyalist Col. Butler made a treaty with the Indians at Fort Oswego and urged the
67 Colbrath, “July 3, 1777, Journal Entry,” in Days of Siege, 16.
68 Colonel Daniel Claus to William Knox, British Undersecretary of State for the Northern Department, October 11,
1777, in John F. Luzader, Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution (New
York: Savas Beatie, 2008), 122.
69 Ibid.
70 Gavin K. Watt, Rebellion in the Mohawk Valley, 88-90.
71 Brigadier General Nicholas Herkimer to Major General Philip Schuyler, July 15, 1777, in Luzader, 126.
72 Thomas Spencer was an Oneida chief (or sachem) he was also a blacksmith. He served as a scout watching St.
Leger’s force prior to his death in the August 6, 1777 Battle of Oriskany.
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county’s men to stand and fight against the British and Indians. On July 17, the Tryon County
Committee of Safety issued a proclamation signed by Herkimer calling up the militia.
. . . every male person, being in health, from 16 to 60 years of age, in this our county,
shall, as in duty bound, repair immediately, with arms and accoutrements, to the place
to be appointed in my orders, and will then march to oppose the enemy with vigor, as
true patriots, for the just defense of their country.73
The militia knew what was coming and prepared to fight. In late July Herkimer sent a party of
militia to Stanwix guarding boats of supplies. The militiamen also felled trees along 20 miles of
Wood Creek to prevent St. Leger’s supplies and artillery from speedily reaching Fort Stanwix.74
St. Leger’s expedition left Fort Oswego on July 26 and marched toward Fort Stanwix. He
sent patrols ahead of his main force of 30 British Regulars under Lt. Henry Bird, and 200 Indians
under Joseph Brant. St. Leger ordered Bird stating “I will have nothing but an investiture made;
and in case the enemy observing the discretion and judgment with which it is made, should offer
to capitulate, you are to tell them that you are sure I am well disposed to listen to them. . .”75 The
patrols failed to prevent the blocking of Wood Creek or to reach the fort before Gansevoort’s
much needed supplies and reinforcements had arrived. On July 29 Gansevoort received word
from Thomas Spencer that the British were marching toward Stanwix. The next day, Capt.
DeWitt’s Company of the 3NY, and Major Ezra Badlam with 150 men of the Ninth
Massachusetts Regiment, reinforced the garrison. They told Gansevoort that seven bateaux of
supplies were en route, guarded by one hundred men. Gansevoort quickly sent one hundred more
men to reinforce the bateaux guards.76
73 Tryon County Committee of Safety to Tryon County Militia, July 17, 1777, in Watt, Rebellion in the Mohawk
Valley, 100-101.
74 Colbrath, “July 26, 1777, Journal Entry,” in Days of Siege, 18.
75 Lieutenant Colonel Barry St. Leger to Lieutenant Henry Bird, August 2, 1777, in Watt, Rebellion in the Mohawk
Valley, 121-122.
76 Colbrath, “July 30, 1777, Journal Entry,” in Days of Siege, 20-21.
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On July 31 the seven supply bateaux arrived at Fort Stanwix just prior to the arrival of
Bird’s patrol. After the safe arrival of these transports, Gansevoort had 750 men, and six weeks
of supplies on hand to resist St. Leger’s besieging force. St. Leger and his advance force arrived
at Fort Stanwix on August 2 and waited for the rest of his army. The rest of St. Leger’s men,
including most of the Loyalists, spent several days cutting a road through the woods to get the
artillery through. On August 3, St. Leger sent Loyalist Capt. Gilbert Tice with a letter requesting
the fort’s surrender. The garrison of Fort Stanwix responded by raising an American Flag,77 as
Gansevoort and his men decided to stand and fight.
On August 3 the Tryon County Militia prepared to march from German Flats to relieve
Fort Stanwix. Herkimer’s proclamation followed by a letter from Gansevoort describing the
killing of two girls and the wounding of a third, outside Fort Stanwix by Indians, helped to rally
the militia to fight. Gansevoort wrote
. . . My Countrymen—is the[re] a Man amongst you whose [soul] does not shudder at
such Dastardly Bloody business—or is there a pulsinanimous heart which requires
Arguments to Urge him to Arms – against the King and Parlimant of Brittan, who . . .
have declared war against our Poor defenseless Infants. . . . the same bloody Tyrant is
employing his Murderers of one kind or another throughout your country – and it is
the Vilest Infatuation to suppose your being only [a] looker, will save you from
Destruction. . .78
After gathering at Fort Dayton, Herkimer and 800 militiamen marched toward Fort Stanwix on
August 4.
After arriving at the Oneida village of Oriska on August 5, Herkimer sent three runners to
Stanwix to tell Gansevoort that the militia was on its way. The runners were to ask Gansevoort to
order a sortie in order to help the militia break through the British lines. The signal to Herkimer
that the sortie was underway would be three cannon shots in rapid succession. On August 6,
77 Colbrath, “August 3, 1777, Journal Entry, in ibid., 26.
78 Col. Peter Gansevoort to Tryon County Committee of Safety, July 29, 1777, in Watt, Rebellion in the Mohawk
Valley, 137.
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Herkimer met with his officers to plan the attack. He wanted to wait for the signal from the fort
before marching, but many of the officers were outspoken in their desire to march immediately.
Col. Ebenezer Cox went so far as to call Herkimer a coward and a loyalist, because he wanted to
wait for the signal from Gansevoort to advance. A livid Herkimer realized that he had to order
the march or he would lose the respect of his men.79 The militia marched toward Stanwix, not
knowing that many of them would be dead before nightfall.
On August 5 Joseph Brant heard from his sister that the militia marched to relive Stanwix.
Early the next morning Brant, Sir John Johnson, and Col. Butler set up an ambush with about
700 Loyalists, Indians, and Hessians near Oriskany Creek. At the onset of the battle, Herkimer’s
militia walked into a horseshoe shaped formation of the enemy. The Indians sprang the ambush
too soon, as only the first three regiments of the militia, the baggage train, and 60 Oneida Indians
had entered the trap. When the first volley was fired, the majority of the Third Regiment of the
Tryon County Militia turned and fled.80 Some of the Indians chased after the fleeing rearguard
killing many, but in doing so prevented the full encirclement of the ambushed militia.
Many senior militia officers were killed or wounded, including Herkimer81 who had sat
on his saddle under a tree calmly directing the battle. After recovering from their initial shock the
militia took the lightly held ridge above the road and formed several small defensive positions.
The Indians waited for a man to fire then rushed to kill him before he could reload. Seeing this,
Herkimer told his men to form two man fire teams, each man providing cover for the other while
he reloaded. This change of tactics led to heavy casualties among the Indians and demoralized
79 Watt, Rebellion in the Mohawk Valley, 152-154.
80 Mike Phifer, Wolves from Niagara: Butler’s Rangers, 1777-1784 (Westminster, Maryland: Heritage Books,
2007), 25-26.
81 Brigadier General Nicholas Herkimer was shot through his lower left leg in the early stages of the battle. He had
his men place him on his saddle under a tree facing the enemy, where he coolly directed his men throughout the
battle. Herkimer died on August 16, 1777, from the combination of his infected wound and blood loss from the
botched amputation of his wounded leg earlier that day.
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them. The tide of the battle had turned. Despite this, the combat continued to be vicious, often
hand-to-hand, and continued unabated until a severe thunderstorm temporarily halted the battle.82
During the storm, Herkimer gathered his scattered militia and formed them into a
defensive circle on the ridge. After the rain stopped, the Loyalist reinforcements led by Col.
Butler reversed their coats to make militia believe that they were a sortie from Stanwix. Many
militiamen initially fell for the ruse, but once it was discovered the militia fought back viciously.
The battle continued until Brant heard the three cannon shots from Stanwix and called for the
Indians to retreat. The Loyalists retreated soon after. The Seneca Chief Blacksnake wrote of the
carnage at Oriskany. “There I have Seen the most Dead Bodies all it over that I never Did see, . .
. I thought at that time the Blood Shed a Stream Running Down on the Decending ground . . .”83
After the battle, the militia collected their wounded and returned home, never reaching Fort
Stanwix.
While the battle raged at Oriskany, Herkimer’s runners arrived at Fort Stanwix and
delivered his request for a sortie to Gansevoort. He immediately ordered Lt. Col. Marinus Willett
with 250 volunteers and one cannon on a sortie to raid the Loyalist and Indian camps. Willett
wrote that “Nothing could be more fortunate than this enterprise.”84 His force “routed two of the
enemy’s encampments”85 and “destroyed all the provisions that were in them. . . .”86 After a brief
skirmish with a small force of Regulars and Loyalists, Willett made it back into the fort without
82 Watt, Rebellion in the Mohawk Valley, 175-177.
83Governor Blacksnake, Chainbreaker: The Revolutionary War Memoirs of Governor Blacksnake as told to
Benjamin Williams Edited by Thomas S. Abler, (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 128, 130.
84 Lt. Col. Marinus Willett, “Hartford, August 21, 1777, The Following is a Narrative of Part of the Transactions At
and Near Fort Stanwix, Since the Investiture of the Place by the Enemy, Given in Manuscript by Lieutenant-Colonel
Willet, of that Garrison,” Early American Imprints, Series 1, no. 43410 (filmed). http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iw-
search/we/Evans/?p_product=EAIX&p_theme=eai&p_nbid=M63H63SYMTI4Njc1MTQxMS4yNjk1NzY6MToxM
zoyMDguOTUuNDkuMTM4&p_action=doc&p_queryname=2&p_docref=v2:0F2B1FCB879B099B@EAIX -
0F2F82203452AF10@43410-@1&f_mode=citation (accessed October 10, 2010).
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
27
losing a man. Willett’s force brought twenty-one wagonloads of much needed equipment and
supplies into Fort Stanwix.87 A major coup in this raid was the capture of Sir John Johnson’s
papers for the expedition. These documents provided important information to Gansevoort on St.
Leger’s plans.
The destruction of their camps enraged the returning Indians, already dispirited due to
their heavy losses at Oriskany, and their captives bore the brunt of this anger. Blacksnake
described the treatment of many prisoners held by the Senecas stating, “they was Kill By
Clubing & Running through a certain Distance and they ware not one Escape they ware all put to
Death by that way. . . .”88 Many captives died in especially brutal ways. Johnson and Brant
requested on August 7 to take the Loyalists and Indians down the Mohawk and complete what
they started at Oriskany. St. Leger refused to allow this course of action since he would not have
enough men to keep up the siege if they left.
On August 8 St. Leger sent a flag to Fort Stanwix under Col. Butler, Major Wesley
Ancron, and a Surgeon with his terms for the surrender of the fort. These terms stated that the
garrison would be protected from the Indians by St. Leger if they surrendered immediately. The
terms also stated that if the fort was carried by storm St. Leger would not be able to protect the
lives of the garrison or the Mohawk Valley residents from Indian reprisals.89 Willett replied to
Major Ancron in no uncertain terms stating, “Our answer was that should this be the case, the
blood of these inhabitants would be upon the heads of Mr. Butler and his employers, not upon us,
and that such proceedings would ever remain a stigma upon the name of Britain; but for our parts
87 Colbrath, “August 6, 1777, Journal Entry,” in Days of Siege, 29-31.
88 Blacksnake, Chainbreaker , 130.
89 Colbrath, “August 8, 1777, Journal Entry,” in Days of Siege, 33-34.
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we were determined to defend the fort.”90 Gansevoort officially rejected the terms the next day.
Gansevoort wrote “Your letter of this day’s date I have received, in answer to which I say, that it
is my determined resolution, with the forces under my command, to defend this fort to the last
extremity, in behalf of the United American States, who have placed me here to defend it against
all their enemies.”91 The longer that Fort Stanwix’s garrison held out, it became less likely that
St. Leger would reach Albany.
St. Leger then began to bombard Stanwix and to construct a siege trench towards the fort.
He realized that his small fieldpieces were impotent against the walls of the fort and that he
needed to try a different approach to using his artillery. St. Leger wrote, “At this time, Lieutenant
Glennie of the artillery . . . proposed a conversion of the royals . . . into howitzers. The ingenuity
and feasibility of this measure striking me very strongly, the business was set about
immediately.”92 St. Leger again faced disappointment as his “mortizers”93 failed to damage the
fort’s works. His army expanded the siege trenches and blocked the creek that supplied water to
the fort, but the garrison had already dug two wells in preparation for this event.94 On August 13,
Ensign Walter Butler led a “Flag Party” of eighteen enemy troops to German Flats, but his party
was taken prisoner two days later by Continentals from Fort Dayton.95 One Loyalist from
Butler’s group, Hon Yost Schuyler, would play a major role in the eventual raising of the siege.
90 Willett, “Hartford, August 21, 1777, Narrative” http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iw-
search/we/Evans/?p_product=EAIX&p_theme=eai&p_nbid=M63H63SYMTI4Njc1MTQxMS4yNjk1NzY6MToxM
zoyMDguOTUuNDkuMTM4&p_action=doc&p_queryname=2&p_docref=v2:0F2B1 FCB879B099B@EAIX-
0F2F82203452AF10@43410-@1&f_mode=citation (accessed October 10, 2010).
91 Colonel Peter Gansevoort to Lieutenant Colonel Barry St. Leger, August 9, 1777, in William L. Stone, Life of
Joseph Brant-Thayendanegea: Including the Border Wars of the American Revolution and Sketches of the Indian
Campaigns of Generals Harmar, St. Clair, and Wayne, vol. 1 (New York: George Dearborn and Co., 1838), 252-
253.
92 Lieutenant Colonel Barry St. Leger to Lieutenant General John Burgoyne, August 27, 1777, in Watt, Rebellion in
the Mohawk Valley, 230.
93 A Cohorn mortar tube placed on a carriage for a three-pounder fieldpiece, as done here by St. Leger’s
artillerymen, was called a “mortizer.”
94 Watt, Rebellion in the Mohawk Valley, 217.
95 Ibid., 224-229.
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During these events, St. Leger’s siege trench advanced close enough to the fort that the men
digging could only work at night due to the fire from the fort. Sappers were almost close enough
to mine under the fort’s walls. Gansevoort realized that if relief did not arrive soon Stanwix
would fall.
On the night of August 8, Willett, and Lt. Levi Stockwell escaped through British lines
in order to get reinforcements to relieve Stanwix,96 arriving at Fort Dayton on August 10. At Fort
Dayton, Willett learned that Gen. Schuyler ordered elements of the 1NY, 2NY, and 4NY as well
as the Massachusetts Brigade of Brigadier General Ebenezer Learned to march to the relief of
Fort Stanwix.97 Maj. Gen. Benedict Arnold volunteered to command the relief force of
Continentals and any militia he could drum up along the way. Willett arrived in Albany and
reported to his superiors on the state of Fort Stanwix in time to return to the Mohawk Valley with
Arnold.
After arriving at Fort Dayton, Arnold began planning how to relieve Fort Stanwix. One
thing was certain, he did not want his column of 1,000 Continentals and militia to face the same
fate as Herkimer’s militia. Arnold called a council of war with his command’s senior officers to
determine their course of action. This council decided that their force was “not equal to that of
the enemy, and it would be imprudent and putting too much to hazard to attempt the march to the
relief of Fort Schuyler, until the army is reinforced . . .”98 Arnold’s war council also decided to
request that General Gates “immediately send such reinforcements to us as will enable us to
march to the relief of the fort, with a probability of succeeding . . .”99 Arnold realized even with
Gansevoort’s 750 men included in his manpower totals that enemy forces outnumbered his own.
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97 Luzader, Saratoga, 136-138.
98 Major General Horatio Gates, “Report of Council of War at German Flatts, August 21, 1777,” in Luzader,
Saratoga, 137.
99 Ibid.
30
What Arnold did not know was that St. Leger’s Indians were very demoralized from the losses in
men and material they incurred on August 6.
The biggest issue Arnold dealt with at this time was avoiding a second Oriskany-type
ambush, as his force needed to cover the same route taken by Herkimer’s force. These fears were
not unfounded, as St. Leger tried to convince the Indians to lead another ambush after he heard
reports of Arnold’s approach. St. Leger even offered to bring the Regulars under his personal
command to assist the Indians in an ambush. However Arnold discovered a way to drive St.
Leger’s army from Fort Stanwix without firing a shot.
One of the Loyalists captured in Walter Butler’s “Flag Party” was Hon Yost Schuyler.
On August 21 Schuyler’s mother and brother begged Arnold to spare his life, believing that all
the Loyalists were to hang. Lt. Col. John Brooks came up with an idea to have Schuyler
“pardoned” at the gallows, shoot his coat full of holes as if he escaped a pursuing force, and run
to Fort Stanwix. Upon arrival, Schuyler would tell the Indians that Gen. Arnold was en route
with thousands of men to relieve the fort and would slaughter all who stood in opposition to his
force. Some Oneidas would follow behind Schuyler, repeating the story in order to ensure his
credibility.100 To ensure Schuyler’s compliance, his brother was held as a prisoner in his place. If
Schuyler failed, he was told that his brother would hang.
On August 19 Gansevoort sent two privates through enemy lines to Fort Dayton in order
to bring updated information on the siege to the Continentals garrisoned there. These men also
were to get news on any incoming reinforcements. By August 21 Gansevoort was getting
nervous due to the lack of outside news, declining provisions, and the oncoming siege trenches.
Gansevoort decided that if help did not arrive soon he would lead a late night breakout and try to
fight his way through St. Leger’s lines. That same day St. Leger received the discouraging news
100 Watt, Rebellion in the Mohawk Valley, 243-246.
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of Arnold’s force heading toward Fort Stanwix. He reported that after hearing of the relief force,
“The same zeal no longer animated the Indians; they complained of our thinness of troops, and
their former losses.”101 In a meeting with the Indian chiefs, he “promised to lead them on myself,
and bring into the field 300 of the best troops.”102 The Indians promised St. Leger that they
would follow him into battle if he would go on a reconnaissance of the battleground,
“accompanied by some of their chief warriors, to settle the plan of operations.”103 For all his
planning, St. Leger’s army would not get the chance to pull off a second Oriskany-type ambush.
On August 22 Hon Yost Schuyler and the Oneidas spread their information about the
extent of Arnold’s force among the Indians, even telling St. Leger himself.104 After hearing these
reports, St. Leger’s army abandoned most of its supplies and equipment and retreated in great
disorder with panic spreading rapidly among the men.105 His main force fled so quickly that
many of the artillerymen and the Canadians and Loyalists digging the siege trenches did not
know the army had left until it was nearly too late for them to escape. An unknown British
officer wrote that “St. Leger’s retreat, as it is called, turns out to be a downright flight, if leaving
his tents, baggage, ammunition, and hiding his artillery can be called so.”106 St. Leger’s rapid
retreat from Fort Stanwix highlighted the success of Benedict Arnold’s foray into psychological
warfare, especially through the use of the rumors spread by Hon Yost Schuyler. On August 23,
Arnold, after hearing word of St. Leger’s retreat, ordered a forced march to Stanwix. On the next
day Arnold and his 1,000 men arrived at Fort Stanwix, ending the siege.
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The massive amounts of supplies and equipment left behind by St. Leger’s army would
help to provision the fort, at least for the near future. Men from the fort’s garrison brought all of
these materials into Stanwix. On August 26 Arnold returned to Major General Horatio Gates’
army that was blocking the British force led by Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne north of Albany. Arnold
took all of the Continentals with him except for Gansevoort’s 3NY and six companies of the
1NY that remained at Fort Stanwix to assist in defending the frontiers.
Fort Stanwix’s successful defense against St. Leger’s expedition prevented his forces
from marching down the Mohawk Valley toward Albany. This success occurred through St.
Leger’s army following the available waterways on its march, in order to ease the transportation
of supplies and heavy equipment. Taking the Mohawk River route forced St. Leger to besiege
the fort. His dismissal of intelligence, on the state of Fort Stanwix and its garrison, that countered
what he had been told at the start of his campaign also contributed to the American victory.
The defeat of St. Leger at Fort Stanwix gave a much needed morale boost to both New
Yorkers and the Continental forces gathering to stop Burgoyne’s army. This change in public
sentiment was evident when New York’s Lieutenant-Governor, Pierre Van Cortlandt discussed
the recent events in an August 26 letter to John Hancock. “The joint Result of these providential
Instances of Success [Stanwix and Oriskany] hath revived the drooping Hopes of the Disponding
and given new Vigor to the firm and determined; we have therefore the pleasing Expectation of
compelling General Burgoyne in his turn to retire.”107 Unfortunately this boost in morale among
New Yorkers did not last long. The failure of St. Leger to take Fort Stanwix did not end the war
in the Mohawk Valley; it was only the beginning.
107 Lieutenant Governor Pierre Van Cortlandt to John Hancock, August 26, 1777, in Jacob Judd, Correspondence of
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From the time of the reconstruction of Fort Stanwix in 1776, many American officers and
officials believed that the fort controlled the invasion routes into the Mohawk Valley. This led to
a belief that as long as Fort Stanwix held, the Mohawk Valley could be protected from enemy
attack. The victory over St. Leger cemented this opinion among officials. Between 1778 and
1781, the Mohawk Valley residents, the army, Congress, and New York State learned the hard
way that there were many directions the enemy could attack Tryon County, and Stanwix only
blocked one of them. These enemy attacks on the Mohawk Valley struck from all directions due
to a change in British strategy that after 1778 focused on using Loyalist and Indian raids to
prevent the use of the valley’s crops to supply the Continental Army.
The war on the Mohawk Valley continued with bloody Indian raids throughout 1778. In
February the spirits of the garrison of Stanwix were still high as they worked to complete the
fortifications and to gather provisions. George I. Denniston wrote to Governor George Clinton,
We are making all the possible preparations for the ensuing campeign at this Garrison
that the season will admit of; we have got in about 1000 Picquets, a large quantity of
Square Timber for Bomb proof Barracks and about 400 Cord of firewood, Provisions
are daily comeing in, . . . I am in hops [sic] we Shall have enough to . . . stand a six
month Siege, should the Enemy . . . mak [sic] any attempts this way next Season.108
Denniston listed the strength of the garrison of Fort Stanwix, still Gansevoort’s 3NY, as
consisting of “438 Rank & File, in good Health a nd full of vigor.”109 Fort Stanwix received an
adequate supply of provisions via sled transport during the winter of 1777-1778, keeping morale
high. Once the weather cleared in the spring, the threat of Indian attack increased dramatically
making Stanwix not only difficult but also dangerous to resupply. Once the raiding parties began
their attacks, there were Indian war parties constantly hovering in the woods outside of the fort
108 George I. Dennison to Governor George Clinton, February 20, 1778, in Public Papers of George Clinton: First
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waiting to ambush the small work details that daily left Stanwix. The constant harassment of the
garrison by these war parties began to demonstrate that Fort Stanwix was not designed to wage
irregular warfare.
Throughout the late winter and early spring of 1778, many settlements requested
Continentals to be garrisoned in the forts near their towns. Several residents of the town of
Cherry Valley signed a letter requesting “a Number of Troops or Raingers, to Guard the frontiers
of the Western part of this State. . .”110 These men worried about a possible upcoming attack by
Joseph Brant and told Gov. Clinton that “some Families are leaveing their Farms & moving
down into the Country, and we have Great reason to fear it will be the Case with us, or fall a pray
to their Savage Barbarities. . .”111 The people’s requests for Continentals to defend them from
Indian raids demonstrated that there were many directions the enemy could take into the
Mohawk Valley that Fort Stanwix could not adequately cover. Throughout the spring of 1778,
residents of outlying settlements along the Mohawk Valley began moving to towns and
settlements with garrisoned forts or even out of the area altogether.112
During the early months of 1778, Gov. Clinton and the Continental Army worked
tirelessly to build up New York’s frontier defenses. In March, Maj. Gen. Marie Joseph Yves
Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette, while on a tour of the Northern Department, ordered
the construction of two new forts in Cherry Valley and in the Oneida village of Kawnowalohale.
Lafayette also ordered several repairs to be conducted at Fort Stanwix and sent Col. Ichabod
Alden’s Sixth Massachusetts Regiment to garrison the forts along the Schoharie Valley and in
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the town of Cherry Valley.113 In mid-April, Ensign Walter Butler escaped from house arrest and
fled west to Niagara, where he arrived on May 17, 1778.114 Abraham Yates wrote, “News we
have none, Except a Disagreeable Tale about the Escape of Mr. Butler who went off, I thinck, a
Saturday Night. Could He be got again it would be a Lucky Circumstance but I am afraid it will
not be the Case.”115 Walter Butler would not be recaptured, and he received a reputation as a
murderer for the horrific atrocities committed by Indians under his command during his raid on
Cherry Valley in November 1778. The Mohawk Valley endured Walter Butler’s raiding
activities until his death at the Battle of West Canada Creek in October 1781.
Small scale Indian and Loyalist raids began in April, destroying isolated settlements,
including Manheim and Ephratah, north of the Mohawk River. From the outset of these raids, the
garrison of the 3NY at Fort Stanwix was nearly impotent to respond, due to the distance of the
fort from the settlements and its inability to know the direction the raiders would attack. The first
major destructive raid by a large force struck Cobleskill on May 30. Brant’s force of 350 routed a
combined force of 100 Continentals and militia and burned Cobleskill. Immense fear spread
throughout the Mohawk Valley. Colonel Jacob Klock observed
Sir, I have received three Expresses from Cherry Valley half an hour’s time, . . . I
received another request from Colo. Ballinger, and he informs me that he . . .
Expected the Flatts will be Run off every minute . . . likewise we have certain
intelligence that Cobus Kill is Run of; . . . Sir, the Enemy strikes in so many places,
that we are not able to stand them; and I would be very much obliged to You if You
would Send me assistance Immediately upon my Receit. Your delay may cause the
loss of the River and likewise of the lives of Several hundred men women and
children.116
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The local militias and regiments of Continentals garrisoned piecemeal at local forts were
powerless to prevent the burning of the settlements, often arriving just after the enemy left the
area. Yet the garrison of Fort Stanwix remained unable to come to their assistance.
That summer Loyalist and Indian forces raided with impunity, striking various
settlements throughout Tryon County. On July 18, 1778, Joseph Brant’s raiders destroyed the
settlements of Springfield and Andrustown, and when the Tryon County Militia marched from
German Flats to stop them, the raiders circled around them and briefly attacked German Flats.
Throughout 1778, both Tryon County and New York State officials and officers repeatedly
requested that strong garrisons of Continentals be placed throughout the Mohawk and Schoharie
Valleys to better defend against these raids. Gen. Philip Schuyler reported,
I received a message . . . from the Oneidas of Oriska Informing me that the Enemy
had destroyed Anderson’s Purchase and Springfield, that they expected the German
Flatts would next be attacked . . . It is much to be Lamented that the finest Grain
County In this State is on the point of being Entirely ruined for want of a body of
Continental troops. If any are to be sent, the Greatest dispatch should be used and
then, perhaps, they may still come in time to save part of the Settlements and
numerous fine crops of wheat.117
Brant’s force destroyed German Flats on September 17. Due to a timely warning, nearly all of
the residents fled to safety at Forts Dayton and Herkimer. Brant’s force completely destroyed
these areas, leaving just prior to the arrival of Col. Jacob Klock’s militia, and Col. Ichabod
Alden’s Continentals. Again, the Garrison of Fort Stanwix was completely unable to aid the
militia and the Massachusetts troops in defending German Flats. It would have taken the 3NY at
least two days to march there.
Throughout 1778, there were repeated rumors of an upcoming attack on the village of
Cherry Valley. These only increased after the summer attacks on Cobleskill, Andrustown,
117 Major General Philip Schuyler to Governor George Clinton, July 20, 1778, in Public Papers of George Clinton,
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Springfield, and German Flats. Meanwhile, the residents of Cherry Valley built a fort for Col.
Alden’s Continentals. Alden made several mistakes during his short command at Fort Alden,
including allowing many of his officers to board in the town rather than reside in the fort.118 This
left his officer corps highly susceptible to death or capture in the event of a surprise attack.
Things remained somewhat quiet in Cherry Valley throughout most of the fall, until
November 6, when Alden received a letter from Gansevoort at Fort Stanwix warning him of a
major enemy force approaching.119 Alden replied that he received Gansevoort’s “Intelligence . . .
of a Large Boddy of the Enemy who ware Collected on the Susquehanna and Ware Desird to
attack this place. . . .”120 He also appraised Gansevoort of the arrival of General Edward Hand in
Cherry Valley to inspect the fort and garrison. The townspeople asked Hand for permission to
place their belongings in the fort, a request he granted. Yet, soon after Hand returned to Albany,
Alden ordered their belongings removed from the fort. Alden did this on the basis that he had
sent out scouting parties, and that they would give the town plenty of warning of an incoming
attack. They failed to deliver any warning as these scouts were captured on the night of
November 10. Fort Stanwix’s efforts to warn Alden of the coming attack on Cherry Valley was a
major intelligence success that gave the town and its garrison five days to prepare for the attack.
Yet, Alden’s incompetent actions and general unpreparedness squandered a golden opportunity
to minimize the loss of life in the village or possibly defeat a major raiding force.
Early in the morning on November 11, a force of 620 Indians, Loyalists and Regulars, led
by Captain Walter Butler, Joseph Brant, and other Indian chiefs, entered Cherry Valley.121 The
initial attack was a success, but Captain Butler lost control of his Indians and Indian Department
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Rangers who killed many women and children setting a bloody precedent for future raids. This
occurred despite the actions of the Regulars, Loyalists, and Brant’s Mohawks to stop these
atrocities.122 In this attack, Col. Alden was among the forty-eight soldier and civilian dead, with
fifteen soldiers and about seventy civilians taken prisoner. Except for Fort Alden, the entirety of
the settlement was destroyed.123 After the raid, Capt. Butler released about forty-five prisoners,
mainly women and children, giving them a letter to bring to Gen. Schuyler. Butler excused
himself from responsibility for the civilian deaths, instead blaming them on the Indians’ anger.
His letter concluded with this statement,
I am sure you are conscious that Colonel [John] Butler or myself have no desire that
your women or children should be hurt. But be assured, Sir, that if you persevere in
detaining my father’s family that we shall no longer take the same pains to restrain
the Indians from killing prisoners, women and children that we have heretofore
done.124
After Cherry Valley, the stakes in the frontier war changed. Women and children were
now considered legitimate targets by many Indians, and even some Loyalists. After the
destruction of Cherry Valley, the raids on the Mohawk Valley frontiers ended for the year.
During the summer of 1778, the soldiers of the 3NY at Fort Stanwix continued their
efforts to defend the western frontier of Tryon County. Gansevoort received reports that the
British had stockpiled supplies and provisions at Fort Oswego in preparation for a new attempt to
take Stanwix. He sent a party led by Lt. Thomas McClellan on July 10 to destroy Oswego and
any supplies the British stored there. McClellan’s men successfully destroyed the abandoned fort
and returned to Fort Stanwix.
During the summer of 1778 the 3NY grew tired of its continued service at Stanwix. This
was due to the danger, boredom from lack of major campaigning (or combat), and the difficulty
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in resupplying the fort. Fort Stanwix became more difficult to resupply through the combination
of distance and the threat of enemy attack. The Indians that lurked near Fort Stanwix in order to
capture or kill unsuspecting soldiers provided the British with a steady stream of information on
the fort. British Captain Thomas Aubrey explained, “I am informed by Mr. Adams that the rebels
are strongly fortifying Fort Stanwix. The prisoners say that there is five hundred and forty men in
the fort, and that they have sent from thence for five thousand men to go against Colonel
Butler.”125 These repairs to the fortifications had been ongoing since the first units were charged
with rebuilding Fort Stanwix in the summer of 1776.
In the fall of 1778 Gansevoort requested that the 3NY be relieved from duty due to his
men’s extreme dislike of their service at Fort Stanwix. On October 17, Washington sent Col.
Goose Van Schaick’s 1NY to relieve Gansevoort’s regiment. Washington wrote to Brig. Gen.
James Clinton, “I have determined to send Col. Van Schaick’s Regiment to Fort Schuyler to
relieve Col. Ganseworth [sic]. You will signify this to Col. Van Schaick that he may be
preparing for it. So soon as the Clothing, expected in camp, arrives; he shall have an order for a
competent supply and will then proceed.”126 The 1NY left Albany for Fort Stanwix on
November 12 and arrived on December 23, 1778.127
In light of the devastation exacted by the 1778 raids, New York State Governor George
Clinton realized that the defensive strategy of attempting to prevent raids with Continental Army
manned forts had failed miserably. Seeing this failure, Governor Clinton along with several
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government officials and army officers, called for the formation of an offensive campaign
strategy to take the war to the enemy. The delegates to Congress from New York, in their reply
to Gov. Clinton, wrote the following:
While we lament the reiterated sufferings of our Fellow Citizens from the
Depredations of the savages and the disaffected, we agree with your Excellency that
every defensive system in a predatory war must prove vain and Chimerical and that a
vigorous Irruption into the Enemy’s Country can alone promise advantage and Safety.
To this great object we shall extend our Views and endeavour to have it carried into
Effect as soon as the Season will permit.128
Throughout the winter and spring of 1778-1779, Gen. Washington planned a massive expedition
that would hopefully destroy the Iroquois Indians. Washington chose Major General John
Sullivan to lead this invasion of the Iroquois homelands.129 There would be two major campaigns
in this: Col. Goose Van Schaick’s Onondaga expedition in April 1779 and the Clinton-Sullivan
Campaign of July through September 1779.
In April 1779, Washington called for an expedition from Stanwix to destroy the villages
of the Onondaga Tribe. This raid was carried out as an attempt to end the Onondaga’s
participation in the raids on the Mohawk Valley.130 Despite the extensive secrecy that surrounded
the preparations for this expedition, the Oneidas saw the gathering men and supplies as a sign of
a coming expedition and asked to join it. In order to prevent them from alerting their Onondaga
neighbors and relatives, Colonel Goose Van Schaick first told the Oneida warriors there was no
expedition. He then honored their requests to go on their own mission, sending an officer and
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some Continentals with them to strike Fort Oswegatchie.131 On April 19, Colonel Goose Van
Schaick, Lt. Col. Marinus Willett, and Major Robert Cochran led 558 Continentals to destroy
Onondaga, the capital of the Iroquois Confederacy. Van Schaick’s men quickly surrounded and
destroyed several of the Onondaga villages. His force completed the six-day, 180-mile forced
march from Fort Stanwix to Onondaga and back without receiving any casualties.132
Van Schaick and his men received extensive praise for the successful expedition from
Washington.133 The Continental Congress also gave its thanks to Van Schaick and his men. John
Jay wrote, “Congress have directed their Thanks to be presented to Colonel Van Schaick & the
Troops under his Command on the Onandaga Expedition. It appears to me most proper that this
be communicated to him by your Excellency, & therefore a Copy of the Resolution on that
Subject is enclosed.”134 After the conclusion of the campaign, the companies who joined it from
other Continental units returned to their respective regiments in order to prepare for the
summer’s campaign against the Iroquois.
The completed plans for the Sullivan expedition called for two main forces of
Continental soldiers to destroy the Iroquois Territory. The first force of 1,600 Continentals under
Brig. Gen. James Clinton left Canajoharie, New York on August 7 and met Gen. Sullivan’s
2,300 Continentals at Tioga on August 22. Washington’s orders to Gen. Sullivan stated,
The expedition you are appointed to command is directed against the hostile tribes of
the Six Nations of Indians, with their associates and adherents. The immediate
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objects are the total destruction devastation of their settlements and the capture of as
many prisoners of every age and sex as possible. It will be essential to ruin their
crops now in the ground and preventing their planting more.135
On August 26, Sullivan’s army of nearly 4,000 men marched into the territory of the Iroquois,
destroying Chemung on August 28. The next day, Sullivan’s men routed a large Loyalist and
Indian force at the Battle of Newtown.136 Between August 29 and September 15, Sullivan’s army
marched north and west, destroying the Indian villages between Newtown and Chenussio, with
all of their crops.
After Newtown, the campaign did not face resistance until a scouting party under
Lieutenant Thomas Boyd was ambushed on its return from Chenussio on September 13. After
the destruction of Chenussio, Sullivan’s army began their march back to Tioga with detachments
sweeping down the east and west sides of the Cayuga and Seneca Lakes to destroy the Cayuga
villages, and any Seneca towns missed on the route taken earlier. Gansevoort received orders to
march due east down the Mohawk River and arrest any Mohawks still living in the villages of
Canajoharie and Tribes Hill. On September 30, the expedition, except for Gansevoort’s
detachment, returned to Tioga.137
Throughout 1777, 1778, and into 1779, Fort Stanwix and its garrisons were instrumental
in helping to assist the United States and the State of New York in their relations with the
Indians. This helped to solidify the ties of the Oneida and Tuscarora tribes to the United States
during the war.138 Lieutenant Colonel Cornelius Van Dyck of the 1NY wrote the following.
A Party of about seventeen Indians who have fled from Ochquago have made
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application to me for Provisions; they say Genl. Schuyler has Promised they should
Draw Provisions at this place. I have put them off until I have your Directions in
what manner to proceed with them. The garrison is Reduced to 15 Days of Salt
Provisions; the fresh Beef is gone and as the Indians are more or Less Daily at the
garrison, they take of considerable Quantities. I, therefore, Request a suply may be
forwarded to this place as soon as Possible.139
During the winter of 1778-1779, the garrison of Fort Stanwix and state officials met with
Oneida, Tuscarora, and some Onondaga delegations either to bolster ties or ensure neutrality.140
After the conclusion of the Onondaga Campaign in April 1779, garrison life at Fort
Stanwix returned to its usual lack of action, with the 1NY remaining in garrison. Van Schaick’s
Expedition alarmed many of the pro-American Oneidas who had close family and marriage ties
with the Onondagas. The Oneidas went to the fort and asked Van Schaick the reasons for the
campaign against the Onondagas, and whether the attack was planned or a mistake. Van Schaick
replied in a manner that pacified the angered American allies.141
I am glad to see my friends, the Oneidas and Tuscaroras. I perfectly remember the
engagements the Five Nations entered into four years ago, and that they promised to
preserve a strict and honorable neutrality during the present war, . . . But the
Onondagas have been great murderers; we have found the scalps of our brothers at
their Castle. They were cut off not by mistake, but by design—I was ordered to do
it—and it is done. . . . I am a warrior. My duty is to obey the orders which they send
me.142
Throughout this time period, Fort Stanwix and its garrisons were instrumental in keeping
relations between the Oneidas and Tuscaroras and the United States on good footing.
Stanwix, throughout this period, continued to be the focus of rumored British attacks. The
garrison would pass this information on to the Continental and militia commanders in the
Mohawk Valley and Albany. This intelligence, some valid, some not, made the lives of officers
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on the Mohawk Valley and at Stanwix very difficult. They were constantly on edge, preparing
for raids that sometimes did not occur. Lt. Col. Cornelius Van Dyck reported in October 1779,
On Wednesday last I was informed by . . . several of the Oneida Indians, that the
Enemy had appeared in force at Oswego . . . that Colonel Johnson with a thousand
Indians is on his way to this place; besides a large Body of Regular Troops. Previous
to this, parties . . . sent from Oneida to Oswego, . . . were told by some of the Enemy
Indians that a number of Heavy Cannon & Morters with them, that the Regulars were
to Besiege this Fort and . . . the Indians would destroy the Country down as far as
Schenectady.143
Sir John Johnson arrived at Oswego on October 13 with every intention of a strike against Fort
Stanwix, the Mohawk Valley, and the Oneida Villages in retaliation for the Clinton-Sullivan
Campaign. This plan was dropped due to the lateness of the season.144
Lurking enemy raids began to be a major problem at Fort Stanwix throughout 1779.
These attacks were aimed at small parties of men who left the fort to gather supplies. These
raiding parties sought to capture prisoners, who the British would interrogate to gather
information about the fort’s defenses. One raid led to the capture of Lieutenant William Scudder
and his party who were out cutting hay near Stanwix on July 23, 1779.145 Another instance where
Fort Stanwix’s regiments lost men to the Indian raiders was on sod-cutting details to repair the
forts walls. Raids such as these made it nearly impossible to leave the fort without a large force
to provide security.
Lack of provisions was a chronic problem in the Continental Army and lasted the
duration of the war. This issue worsened at Fort Stanwix through the constant threat of attacks.
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The Oneidas also drew heavily from the supplies at Stanwix.146 There was a general effort to
keep as large a supply in Stanwix as possible, especially during the planning stages of the
Clinton-Sullivan Campaign, when there was a possibility that the expedition might have
advanced west from the Mohawk River into Iroquois territory. Washington wrote,
You are to order the Quarter Master and Commissary immediately to lay in as large a
supply of provision as they possibly can at Fort Schuyler. This will be necessary,
should it be finally determined to remove the troops up the River in preference to
Susquehannah, or it will at any rate form an ample Magazine for the support of the
Garrison. The collection of provision at that post will also hold up the appearance of
operating from that quarter, altho’ we may really have no such intent.147
By the winter of 1779 New York State officials were only able to provision Fort Stanwix and the
other forts on a day-by-day basis.148
Throughout the period during the reconstruction of Fort Stanwix in July 1776 through the
winter of 1779, the fort saw only limited success in its efforts to defend the Mohawk Valley from
enemy invasion. In 1776 the refortification of Stanwix began amidst rumors of impending
invasion by British, Loyalist, and Indian forces. While this invasion did not occur, reconstruction
had advanced far enough that the fort could be defended if necessary. In 1777 the British under
Barry St. Leger besieged Fort Stanwix. While still not completely restored, the fort withstood St.
Leger’s force and prevented it from sweeping down the Mohawk Valley to Albany. This also
cemented the official mindset that, as long as Fort Stanwix remained in American hands, the
Mohawk Valley could be successfully defended against enemy attack. This flawed school of
thought proved false during the raids of 1778.
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During the raids of 1778, the Loyalist and Indian parties demonstrated Fort Stanwix’s
inability to defend against an irregular war, where the enemy could strike from any direction, at
most any place, at any time. Stanwix’s garrison was unable to come to the assistance of the
destroyed settlements in time to prevent or to drive off attacks. After the expedition against the
Onondagas of Col. Goose Van Schaick in 1779, the usual supply problems and enemy attacks
that had occurred since the rebuilding of the fort increased to levels that made Stanwix a drain on
Continental Army resources and manpower.
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Chapter Two:
The Events of January – August 1780, Fort Stanwix Untenable?
Throughout 1780 the financial and supply issues at both the state and the national level
exacerbated the supply and manpower problems at Fort Stanwix. After declaring bankruptcy in
December 1779, the Continental Congress overhauled the Staff Department system that supplied
the Continental Army. This led to the formation of the Select Supply System that required the
states to provide certain quotas of army supplies. This system proved inadequate to the task.
Many states, including New York, had a difficult time acquiring the necessary supplies for many
reasons, including enemy action.149 New York waited for the fall harvest from two of its best
grain producing areas, the Mohawk and Schoharie Valleys, in order to fill its 1780 supply
quotas.150 In 1780, Sir Frederick Haldimand, the Governor of Canada, sent Sir John Johnson on
two large raids in May and October, and also sent Joseph Brant on a large raid in July-August of
that year. These raids not only destroyed the 1780 grain harvest and prevented New York from
using it to resupply the Continental Army garrisons in the state, but also demonstrated the
impotence of Fort Stanwix in defending against these enemy actions.
In December 1779, the Continental Congress realized it was almost bankrupt and looked
for ways to cut costs and programs. As a result, Congress decided to hand the cost and problem
of supplying the army over to the states through the State Supply System. On February 25, 1780,
Congress sent out a resolution that told each of the states—except Georgia—their quotas for the
coming campaign season.151 New York was to provide, “11,200 hundred weight of beef[,]
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13,969 barrels of flour[,] 500 tons of hay[, and]  30,000 bushels of Indian corn, or other short
forage equivalent.152 New York faced difficulties in its attempt to fulfill these quotas, while also
supplying the New York Line and Levies regiments as well as the forts in the state.
Keeping the frontier fortifications supplied, especially Fort Stanwix, was a major
undertaking even in peaceful conditions, and became even more difficult under the constant
threat of enemy attacks. The severe winter of 1779-1780 made the resupply of Stanwix more
difficult than usual, and Col. Van Schaick wrote to Washington about the dangerously low levels
of supplies throughout the Northern Department.
The purchasing Commissaries inform me that they have not been enable [sic] to
purchase provision during the course of last Winter, for the want of money, & that are
still without, from which cause our Magazines in this quarter are at present reduced to
so low a State, that but very small supplies can be drawn from them. I also beg leave
to inform your Excellency that the ammunition at this place consists at present half a
Ton of powder & Ball in proportion, a Quantity, which in all probability will be
judged insufficient should we have frequent occasion to call out the Militia.153
As the 1780 spring campaign season neared, Van Schaick urgently called for supplies for Fort
Stanwix. “Let me intreat you to keep your Eyes well fixed towards Fort Schuyler. Make frequent
inquiries whether the Mills at Schenectady & the River are Grin ding Wheat for the use of that
Garrison. Stimulate with your advise [sic] the Commissaries, & others concerned to forward the
Flour to Fort Schuyler while it is yet time.”154 The supply shortages at Fort Stanwix and the other
frontier posts worsened considerably through the failure of the Select Supply System.
New York received a monthly supply quota above and beyond its original requests from
the Continental Congress. According to Colonel Ephraim Blaine this quota consisted of “one
hundred & forty barr’s o f flour and seventy one thousand six hundred & Seventy five pounds of
152 Continental Congress, In Congress, February 25, 1780, 1.
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Beef p Month; . . .”155 He also wrote that the supplies were urgently needed since “there is
fourteen Brigades assembled in this neighbourhood and Recruits hourly comeing in, which with
the followers of the army, now Consume one hundred barrels of flour, & Sixty five Beef Cattle
daily.”156 Governor George Clinton, while waiting for the quota to be gathered, had the New
York State Assembly and Senate write to Congress for permission to change the state’s required
beef quota to flour. Congress replied with this resolution
Congress passed the following resolution: Whereas the State of New York was
required, by an act of Congress of the 25 February last, to furnish eleven thousand two
hundred cwt. of beef; and whereas it will be of public advantage to procure flour as
near as possible to the military posts and quarters of the army: Resolved, That
Congress do agree, that the State of New York, according to their proposal set forth in
the letter above mentioned, may substitute flour in lieu of any quantity of beef which
may be deficient on the 1st day of November next, of the quota allotted to the said
state,  . . .157
Though Clinton received permission from Congress to use flour to replace the unfilled beef
quota, he had to wait for the grain to be harvested. Much of New York’s grain crop grew in the
Mohawk and Schoharie Valleys in Tryon and western Albany counties.
Throughout the spring and summer of 1780, Fort Stanwix remained in desperate need of
food and ammunition. Van Schaick wrote “I have not hitherto been able with the utmost
Exertions to throw into Fort Schuyler, more provisions than to feed them from hand to mouth, . .
. Altho I shall leave no means untried to have the Garrison of Fort Schuyler supplied, it is at
present out of my power to promise that I shall be able to accomplish it. Provisions & men to
guard them up are wanted.”158 Clinton, due to the danger of Indian attack, could not send enough
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foodstuffs to keep the fort supplied.159 What would make this even more difficult were the orders
from Congress’ Board of War to close the Continental Army supply depots at “Schenectady,
Schoharra, Johnstown, Fort Plank, [and] Oneida Castle. . . .”160 Realizing that the closing of
these posts would eliminate both the local militia meeting and supply places and all of the supply
depots between Albany and Fort Stanwix, Van Schaick opted to supersede these orders and “to
continue an Issuing Commissary at each of the following Posts; Schoharry, Fort Plank, &
Sacondago.”161 Gov. Clinton agreed with Van Schaick and suggested other posts to keep open.
These posts would be very important to the residents of the Mohawk and Schoharie Valleys in
the coming months.
For the 1NY at Fort Stanwix, the boredom, danger, lack of supplies, as well as length of
service162 began to wear on their morale. Van Schaick requested in February 1780 that his men
be transferred from Fort Stanwix.163 He wrote to Washington
That from the length of Time the Regiment has been Stationed at Fort Schuyler & the
Remoteness of the Country, many disadvantages have arisen to the Officers &
Soldiers with respect to Cloathing, & other necessaries. I shall therefore with the
Officers be happy that the Regiment may be Relieved the Ensuing Spring, if that can
be done consistent with the good of the service.164
Washington replied, promising that the 1NY would be relieved “as soon as the Season and
circumstances will admit . . .”165 While waiting to be relieved, the garrison of Fort Stanwix
continued its efforts to defend the Mohawk Valley and New York’s western frontiers, although
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the events that occurred during the spring and summer of 1780 would work to ensure the fort’s
failure.
The farmers along the Mohawk and Schoharie Valleys believed that in 1780 there would
finally be peace on the frontiers due to the 1779 Clinton–Sullivan Campaign against the Iroquois.
The frontier residents also were encouraged by the prospect of a good crop harvest in 1780 after
the crop failures of 1779 and recent severe winter. But, they would yet again be subjected to
repeated raids and bloodshed beginning in early 1780. Throughout the year, Mohawk Valley
residents continued to beg for more Continental troops to be sent to the area. Yet, while the
people asked for more troops, the 1NY remained untouched in Fort Stanwix, thirty miles—a two
to three day march—away from the nearest settlements they defended. This left the garrison
unable to assist the settlers during the raids. The first large scale incursion occurred in May,
when Sir John Johnson struck the village of Caughnawaga and the surrounding area from Tribes
Hill west through the Sand Flats.
In Tryon County, large numbers of loyalists still resided in the town of Johnstown. In the
spring of 1780, county officials decided that all military aged men in the settlement would be
forced into the county militia or sent to prison.166 Hearing of this from one of his spies, the
British governor of Canada, General Sir Frederick Haldimand ordered Sir John Johnson to bring
the loyalists to Canada.167 Haldimand wrote to a Captain Fraser:
Having thought it expedient for His Majesty’s Service to Detach a Considerable Party,
composed of Regulars, Provincials, and Indians under the command of Sir John
Johnson, in order to Distress the Enemy, and to give the persecuted Loyalists an
opportunity to escape to this Provisce you will please to consider in which way you
can best contribute to his assistance by a cooperateing Party of Indians from your post
(and Troops if you judge necessary and can spare them).168
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Johnson’s expedition left for Johnstown on May 3, travelling down Lake Champlain to Crown
Point, and from there southwest through the Adirondack Mountains, arriving at Johnson Hall, his
home in Johnstown, on  May 21.  Once there, he divided his 528 men into two parties in order to
maximize the effectiveness of his raid. One party consisted mainly of Indians and marched east
to burn Tribes Hill, while Johnson led the remainder to lay waste to Caughnawaga.169 Later, after
the two groups reunited at Caughnawaga, Johnson’s force headed west, burning its way toward
Anthony’s Nose before returning to Johnson Hall.170 Johnson also wanted to burn Stone Arabia
on this raid, but his Indians were against it, due to the fatigued condition of the expedition, and
because the settlers escaped to the local forts with their goods, leaving no scalps or plunder.171
Immediately upon hearing of the raid, the local militia began gathering to try to stop
Johnson’s force.172 Colonel Morgan Lewis reported “They [the enemy] shew a Disposition, ‘tis
said, to fight; and the Militia under Colonels Wemple and Harper consisting of about four
hundred & fifty are dete rmined to fight them. The Militia of this Place are moving on, but I am
afraid will be too late for action.”173 Van Schaick was sent to Fort Hunter to collect the militia
and attack Johnson’s force, but he was unable due to the slow gathering of the militia.
Insufficient provisions and loyalists spreading rumors of other incoming raids also hampered
Van Schaick’s force.174 Johnson’s force successfully avoided the militia and New York Levies
that chased it toward Crown Point. Johnson’s force, plus prisoners, plunder, and many loyalist
families, arrived in Canada. Sir John wrote in his official report that
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. . . the number of houses Barns Mills &c Burnt amount to about one hundred
twenty— . . .  Vast Quantities of flour Bread Indian Corn and other Provisions were
burnt in the houses and Mills, and a great Number of Arms Cash &c many Cattle were
killed and about Seventy horses brought off One Hundred and forty three Loyalists
and a number of Women and Children with about thirty Blacks Male and female
came off with us— . . .175
Johnson’s May 22 raid was a complete success. Johnson, by entering the Mohawk Valley from
the north and east, rather than from the west, completely nullified any hope that Fort Stanwix
could prevent the raid. Due to the distance between Fort Stanwix and Caughnawaga, the garrison
of the fort was unable to assist in the defense against this raid.
Johnson reported to Haldimand about the upcoming fall wheat harvest in the Mohawk
Valley and how good it was going to be. He would return in the fall to destroy Stone Arabia and
the region’s harvested crops. In July, Gov. Clinton received this information about the upcoming
Tryon County fall grain harvest from Abraham Yates.
I am informed that the enemy of late have with small parties burned the evacuated
Houses in the upper parts of Tryon County and that we have not men sufficient to
drive them off but are obliged to keep in their little forts; if so, how will they get in
their Harvest (the best that ever was in this County); if it is in, how will they preserve
it from being destroy’d (I don’t mean the whole, some part must go); I could wish that
some measure could be fallen upon to save it.176
Through information given by captured Loyalists, New York State officials realized the wheat
and grain harvest in the Mohawk and Schoharie Valleys, if not protected properly, would be
destroyed. This would effectively prevent New York from filling its quota of supplies for the
Continental Army.177
In May 1780, Van Schaick heard rumors that the British planned to attack Fort Stanwix
again. This report came from militiamen who had recently escaped from captivity in Montreal.
These men received word of this when their prison guards told them in great detail
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about the British preparations for this upcoming attack. Ebenezar Clark and John Barns wrote,
“William Woodworth, . . . says that during his Confinement several Hessians of his Guard . . .
told him, that on the 15th of this Instant 5000 Indians, Regulars, & Tories were to set out from
Montreal in order to attack Fort Stanwix . . .”178 This information, while false, led to increased
concerns about the status and safety of Fort Stanwix’s garrison.
Meanwhile, the 1NY still waited to be relieved from duty. On May 19, Washington wrote
to Van Schaick that the 1NY would soon be relieved by “a sufficient number of the 800 Militia
to be taken into Continental pay for the defence of the Frontier,”179 Washington continued, “I
have proposed that Colo. [Lt. Col.] Van Dyck shall remain in command, retaining one or two
Commissioned and a few good non Commissioned Officers to assist him.”180 Five days later
Washington changed his mind, writing to Van Schaick that “I have determined not to draw your
Regt. From Fort Schuyler, and I cannot but hope that by their remaining there, and the cover
which will be afforded by the 800 Militia when embodied and properly disposed, the people will
be encouraged to stay at home and give occasional succor.”181 As the 1NY continued to garrison
Fort Stanwix in 1780, there were increasing numbers of desertions due to the constant
deficiencies of pay, food, clothing, and shoes.  These contributed to the desertion of thirty-one
men from the garrison on May 22, with the intention of joining the British at Fort
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Oswegatchie.182 Van Dyck sent Lieutenant Abraham Hardenbergh of the 1NY and forty Oneida
Indians to capture the deserters. Once the Indians and Hardenbergh caught up to them at the
Grand River, the sixteen deserters who had not yet crossed the river opened fire. The Oneidas
returned fire and killed thirteen of the deserters and captured three, before they returned to Fort
Stanwix.183
The desertions and Johnson’s May 1780 raid placed Fort Stanwix on high priority for
supplies.184 On June 6, Brig. Gen. James Clinton ordered Col. Peter Gansevoort’s 3NY to guard
a train of provisions from Fort Plank to Fort Stanwix.185 His orders stated that, “it is absolutely
necessary that you should pay the strictest attention to prevent Surprise and in Case of an Attack,
to defend the Stores to the last Extremity—the present Situation of the Garrison points out the
absolute necessity of this Caution.”186 The problems keeping Fort Stanwix provisioned continued
throughout the late spring and early summer of 1780. During this period, Washington repeatedly
ordered provisions and clothing sent to Stanwix lest the fort fall due to a lack of supplies.187
Washington wrote,
The security of the Western part of the State of New York depends so absolutely
upon holding the post of Fort Schuyler, that I shall not be easy until I have thrown a
handsome supply of provision into it. You will therefore be pleased instantly to send
up one hundred Barrels of Flour to Albany addressed to Colonel Van Schaick, who
will forward it, and . . . one hundred Barrels of Beef . . . This will be wanted for the
Garrison at the fort also, and must therefore be of sound and good quality.188
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Despite the major efforts undertaken by the Continental Army to keep the fort supplied, there
was never enough of anything to keep the garrison’s morale up. These problems would only
worsen during the summer, when the anger of the British-allied Iroquois nations against the
Oneidas for allying themselves with the Americans manifested itself.
The Oneidas worried about their safety after Iroquois refugees living with them moved to
Niagara. These refugees claimed that the Oneida villages would soon be destroyed.189 On June
18, several Oneida Sachems arrived at Fort Stanwix and gave a proclamation on their tribe’s
situation. “Brother, we are in great Consternation. . . yesterday the last of the Kanaghserages and
Onondagos left us & say that our Town must be distr oyed to open the road to the Mohawk River
so far as Schenectady or Albany.”190 The Oneida Sachems said that after escorting their women
and children east toward the American settlements where they would be safer, the warriors
would return to Stanwix.191 They were too late in leaving. On June 24 and 25, two war parties of
Indians and Loyalists arrived at Old Oneida to convince the Oneidas to join the British. Many of
the Oneidas agreed to join the British at Niagara, but only if their imprisoned chiefs, Skenandon
and Good Peter, were allowed to return to gather their families.192
Most of the Oneidas at the other villages decided not to go to Niagara. These Indians
reported the events that occurred at Old Oneida to Reverend Samuel Kirkland the American
Indian Agent at Fort Stanwix. Kirkland recorded the information he received about the enemy
plans to besiege Fort Stanwix and to force the Oneidas to go to Niagara, using the captive chiefs
as hostages to ensure compliance.193 On July 11, Joseph Brant, Skenandon, Good Peter and more
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than 300 Indians and Tories left Niagara for the Oneida villages. Brant reached Kanonwalohale
and other Oneida villages on July 26, and destroyed them. The pro-American Oneidas fled to
Fort Stanwix prior to Brant’s arrival. Brant’s force went to Fort Stanwix and tried to convince
the Oneidas outside the fort to join the British at Niagara. Most of the Oneida who complied with
his demands were women, children, and elderly, as most of the warriors fled into Fort Stanwix.
After this, Brant’s force traded fire with Stanwix’s garrison for about a day before leaving.194
During all this, Fort Stanwix was yet again short of supplies. Major John Graham of the
1NY stated, “previous to this I sent Cap’n Hicks with sixty men & fifty Oneida warriours to
guard up the boats from Fort Herkamer. The situation of the garrison obliged me to take this
step, as I was informed by express that Capt. V Renselaer could not proceed for want of a
Guard.”195 Throughout that summer, Van Schaick, despite his exertions, had been unable to get
enough provisions into Fort Stanwix, and the garrison was forced to live “from hand to
mouth.”196 Van Schaick went on to say, “Altho I shall leave no means untried to have the
Garrison of Fort Schuyler supplied, it is at present out of my power to promise that I shall be able
to accomplish it. Provisions and men to guard them up are wanted.”197 Finding men to guard
supply convoys was a recurring problem throughout the war, but it became acute in 1780. This
was especially true after Brant’s August 2 destruction of the Canajoharie District.
The garrison of Fort Stanwix also faced acute deficiencies in ammunition. Gen.
Washington ordered Lt. Col. Udny Hay to:
provide the means of transporting powder and Ball and Cartridge paper to the
amount of one hundred thousand rounds to Albany. . . . The critical situation of Fort
194 Joseph T. Glatthaar and James Kirby Martin, Forgotten Allies: The Oneida Indians and the American Revolution
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2006), 269-271.
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Schuyler renders a speedy relief necessary. Men will be ready for the purpose, but
there is not a sufficiency of Ammunition at Albany. . . . They are to be delivered to
Mr. Van Rensselaer Commy of Military Stores at Albany.198
The destruction of the Oneida villages led to the vast majority of the Oneidas moving east from
Fort Stanwix to Schenectady.  This removed Fort Stanwix’s most reliable source of intelligence
on enemy activities in the area. This, combined with the constant threat of attack and the lack of
supplies, helped to create a nearly untenable situation.
After leaving Fort Stanwix, Brant’s force marched on August 2 into Tryon County, where
it destroyed the Canajoharie and the surrounding district.199 This attack occurred soon after the
local militia left to guard a supply train on its way to Fort Stanwix. Lt. Col. Samuel Clyde
described the events surrounding the raid.
. . . this affir hapend at a verry onfourtnat Hour, when all the Militia of the County
was Called up to Fort Schuyler, to guard nine Battows about half Loded. It was said
the Enemy intended to cut of on their Pasidge; there was schers a man left that was
abel to go, that it seems as every thing Conspaired for our Destruction; In this quarter
one holl District allmost Destriod and the best Rejmt. Of Militia her rendrad unable to
help themselves or the Publick. . . [sic].200
This raid led to the Tryon County Militia’s unwillingness to escort convoys of provisions to Fort
Stanwix. The men did not want to leave their families and homes defenseless in the face of an
enemy attack again.
During Brant’s raid, the party of Indians sent to capture Fort Plank retreated when fired
on by those inside of the fort, and Brant’s force left upon the arrival of the militia. The men
returned home when they saw the smoke from the burning buildings. British Lieutenant Joseph
198 General George Washington to Lieutenant Colonel Udny Hay, July 31, 1780, in Fitzpatrick, Writings of George
Washington, vol. 19, 288-289. http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/ot2www-
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Clements wrote, “The extent of the settlement destroyed was in length on the Mohawk River
above 6 miles and above 4 in breadth and contained above 100 houses, two mills, 1 Church and 2
Forts – They took and killed 300 head of Black Cattle – 200 Horses. Besides Sheep, hogs,
poultry &ca a Considerable quantity of grain of di fferent kinds. The Number of Killed and
Prisoners amounts to above 45.”201 This destructive raid highlighted the inability of Fort Stanwix
to stop these highly motivated Indian and Loyalist raiding parties. It also demonstrated the need
to reinforce the New York frontier garrisons. This reinforcement was a necessity in order to
guard supply trains to Fort Stanwix, so the militia could protect their families and harvest their
crops.
Throughout the summer of 1780, the officials and residents of the Mohawk Valley
continued to call for reinforcements to ease the burden on the Tryon County Militia in defending
their harvests and homes during the fall.202 The Commissioners of Conspiracies in the State of
New York also called for reinforcements in their report.203
. . . We are led to believe that the Enemy have it in view to (and will if possible),
destroy all the grain to the Northward & Westward, a measure which is carried into
Execution will certainly greatly distress us; we would therefore, suggest the necessity
of sending a strong Party to the Westward for the Purpose of aiding the Inhabitants in
gathering the grain, threshing the same, and bringing it down to a Place of Safety. The
Crops are so great they are not able of themselves to gather them and perform the
Duties the Country requires.204
The citizens of Tryon County called for reinforcements when they realized that their grain
harvests would likely encourage destructive raids. Washington ordered 500 Massachusetts
201 Lieutenant Joseph Clements, “August 14, 1780 Report,” in Johnson, The Bloodied Mohawk, 41-42.
202 Colonel Peter Vroman and others to Governor George Clinton, July 24, 1780, in Public Papers of George
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Campen’s house for an extended period. In this interrogation, Van Campen gave the commissioners a large amount
of information that he received from his son-in-law on upcoming enemy plans set for the fall of that year.
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Levies to head west to Tryon County and told their commander, “As Fort Schuyler is probably
invested by this time it is of the utmost Importance that these troops should be expedited without
a moment’s delay. . .”205 The 500 Massachusetts Levies, commanded by Colonel John Brown,
arrived in Tryon County in early August and garrisoned several of the major forts along the
Mohawk and Schoharie Valleys.206
Brown’s Levies guarded the shipments of supplies sent to Fort Schuyler. They also
worked other missions in the defense of Tryon County. General Robert Van Rensselaer wrote
“On Saturday last, I sent of Twelve Boats with Provision for Fort Schuyler, Escorted by two
hundred Men under the Command of Collo. Brown, of the Massechutsets Levies, which leaves
the Frontiers verry thin of Men. I have also sent out a scout to Unedilla and Ocquage, at which
places I am suspicious they make their Rendevouz.”207 The arrival of Brown’s men allowed the
militia to stay closer to their homes and gather their grain harvests in relative safety.
During the events of July and August in the Mohawk Valley and at Fort Stanwix, the low
morale of the 1NY was still a major issue. The fort’s isolation exacerbated the effects of the
threat of enemy attack, lack of supplies, and the duration of service. Washington, alarmed by the
discontent of Stanwix’s garrison, ordered Colonel William Malcom208 to send the New York
(NY) Levies to relieve them on August 28.209 Washington wrote to Col. Van Schaick concerning
the coming relief for his regiment, “I am induced to order Col Malcolm with the levies under his
205 George Washington to Massachusetts Levies, July 31, 1780, in Public Papers of George Clinton, vol. 6, 68.
206 Governor George Clinton, “August 11, 1780, General Orders,” in ibid., 97.
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command to proceed to the frontier. One of the objects for sending him will be to relieve the
garrison of Fort Schuyler. You will therefore put your regiment under marching orders and when
the relief arrives will march it to join the army.”210The 1NY left Fort Stanwix in late September.
After the raids of Johnson in May and Brant in August, rumors and reports spread of a
planned invasion to destroy Stone Arabia.211 Lewis Morris reported this news to Gov. Clinton.
“We have just received an Express from Tryon County . . . that Sir John Johnston [sic] has sent a
party into Johnstown, to inform the Inhabitants that he is coming on with 2000 men, and intends
making his first stroke at Stone Arabia.”212 When interrogated, suspected loyalists told New
York State officials that the British desired to destroy the grain harvest in order to prevent its use
by the Continental Army. Peter Van Campen gave state officials the following information he
received from his loyalist son-in-law. “Parties would come down the Mohawk and North Rivers
immediately after the Harvest was gathered, to destroy the grain which would effectually knock
up our Army, as they had Information that Provisions were very scarce here and that the Crops
below were very bad.”213 Johnson would attack Tryon County in October, leaving a swath of
destruction in his wake.
Fort Stanwix was unable to successfully defend the western frontiers of New York
against the 1780 raids. Its isolated position at the head of navigation of the Mohawk River left its
garrison completely unable to counter the raid of Sir John Johnson on May 22. This raid struck
from the north and destroyed the area between Tribes Hill and Anthony’s Nose. The fort’s
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Washington, vol. 19, 459-460.
http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/ot2www-
washington?specfile=/texts/english/washington/fitzpatrick/search/gw.o2w&act=surround&offset=24467583&tag=
Writings+of+Washington,+Vol.+19:+To+COLONEL+GOOSE+VAN+SCHAICK&query=Fort+Schuyler&id =
(accessed on October 28, 2010).
211 Lewis R. Morris to Governor George Clinton, August 24, 1780, in Public Papers of George Clinton, vol. 6, 136-
137.
212 Ibid., 136.
213 Extract of Peter Van Campen’s Examination, July 20, 1780, in ibid., 44-45.
62
garrison was unable to adequately protect the Oneida towns from Joseph Brant’s raid in July.
After Brant drove the Oneidas from their villages, Fort Stanwix lost much of its intelligence
assets, as the Oneidas had previously reported on the movements of raiding parties to the
commandant at Stanwix. With this raid the garrison of Stanwix had the best chance to prevent an
attack on the Mohawk Valley, and it failed miserably. Fort Stanwix, by not stopping Brant,
missed an opportunity to prevent the August 2 destruction of the Canajoharie District. At this
point Fort Stanwix, now completely blind, became a liability to the Continental Army.
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Chapter Three:
The Events of Fall 1780 – Spring 1781, Fort Stanwix Continued to Drain Continental Army
Supplies and Manpower Until the End.
After Joseph Brant’s destruction of the Oneida villages in July, Fort Stanwix became
further isolated. Its standing at the very western edge of the frontier led to the ease with which
the enemy could constantly harass its garrisons. This position prevented the fort from stopping
raids through the enemy’s ability to attack the Mohawk Valley at will. This was especially true
after the Oneidas were driven from their villages in July 1780. The raid of Sir John Johnson in
October ensured Stanwix’s continued drain on Continental Army supply depots. This occurred
through Johnson’s destruction of the grain harvests in the Schoharie and Mohawk Valleys. These
all made Fort Stanwix a nearly untenable position costing the Continental Army a tremendous
amount just to keep supplied. This led to Col. William Malcom’s rejected call for the demolition
of Fort Stanwix in favor of a new post about thirty miles to the east prior to Johnson’s raid in
October.
In September 1780 Col. Malcom, the acting Commander of the Northern Department
repeatedly asked that Lieutenant Colonel Albert Pawling be sent to take command of Fort
Stanwix.214 Col. Brown of the Massachusetts Levies informed Malcom of the poor discipline in
Col. John Harper’s regiment. Malcom stated that “Co’l Brown . . . informs me that some
Companys of Harpurs have mutinyed on receiving the orders of march and that the officers are
the Abbettors — not being willing to leave particular places—and he gives it as his Opinion that
they are not a Corps to be trusted in the Garrison”215 In order to reform Harper’s regiment prior
214 Colonel William Malcom to Governor George Clinton, September 14, 1780, in Letters Composed by Colonel
William Malcom, http://www.fort-plank.com/William_Malcoms_Letters.html (accessed on October 28, 2010).
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2010).
64
to its going into garrison at Stanwix, he placed Major James Hughes and other good officers in
the unit to make it battle ready.216 Malcom also sent Harper away on furlough.
The change in officers improved the unit until the men heard that Johnson’s raid was
approaching the Mohawk Valley in October 1780. The same old concerns about supplies and
provisions continued. However, Col. Malcom had a new concern, the lack of sufficient
manpower to be a strong garrison.
We shall not have 9 months men enough to form the Garrison — not more than 200
as far as I can yet find out . . . I wish the General would send up a small Conl [sic]
Regiment — but I rather think he Trusts to the State for the Frontiers & also the
Garrison of fort Scuyler . . . I am now pretty well convinced that the Country may be
kept Quiet with good management, & a few good Troops. . . . 217
Despite his attempts to gather more men, the NY Levies under Maj. Hughes would be the total
garrison serving at Fort Stanwix until relieved in November. Throughout the fall of 1780, Col.
Malcom worked to try to keep the garrisons of Fort Stanwix and the other forts in the Northern
Department supplied. Col. Malcom and his men, while guarding a supply convoy to Fort
Stanwix, attacked and routed a small force of Indians that sought to ambush them. Governor
Clinton wrote that “Our friend Malcom on his Way with a Part of the Levies of this State to
relieve the Garrisson of Fort Schuyler, fell in with, charged & routed a Party of the Savages.
They left two Dead on the ground about thirty Blanketts Kettles &c.” 218
Sir Frederick Haldimand, the British Governor of Canada, learned through his spies, and
the reports of members of the Johnson and Brant raids, that a bumper crop of grain was expected
in the Mohawk and Schoharie Valleys. Haldimand decided in September to send another
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expedition under Sir John against Tryon County with the objective of destroying the harvest.219
Haldimand told Johnson that “This is a Critical period to detach Troops but to effect so essential
a Service, I would risk it. I must therefore desire you will by the next Post give me your ideas
upon the most Eligible means to carry it into immediate Execution, for if it is to be done there is
no time to lose as the Corn . . . will be hurried away the moment it is fit to Transport.”220 Johnson
already planned for this and wrote back to Haldimand that his goal was “to remove, or Cut them
off, as well as to destroy the vast Crops of Grain, by this time housed, in every part of the
County.”221 Although there was tremendous amount of risk involved in an expedition this late in
the year, Johnson replied, ”I do it with great Chearfulness.”222 Johnson then prepared to meet his
force of 780 men at Oswego.
Johnson planned to have more men, but sickness at Fort Niagara forced many to remain
behind. Johnson and Haldimand tried and failed to keep the expedition a secret. Meanwhile, the
expedition could not leave Oswego until October 1 due to the men who could join Johnson from
Niagara being delayed in a storm. On October 5, Johnson’s men hid their boats near the east end
of Onondaga Lake and began the long march toward the Schoharie Valley.223 While en route,
Johnson received disheartening news from four prisoners, that despite all the secrecy
surrounding his expedition, the Americans knew he was coming. They did not, however, know
the direction of his approach.224 Soon after the capture of the prisoners, an Oneida Indian
deserted Johnson’s expedition and travelled to Fort Stanwix where, with a mortar shell as
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evidence, he alerted the Americans to the intended targets of the coming raid.225 The fort’s
garrison passed this important intelligence on the raid to Col. Malcom in Albany. At this time,
the men of Stanwix’s garrison told their officers that they would surrender if Johnson’s force
approached the fort.
After he learned of the direction and targets of Johnson’s expedition, Malcom sent the
information to Brig. Gen. Robert Van Rensselaer, who commanded the Albany County Militia.
Malcom ordered him to call out his militia and to send supplies for the gathering troops.226
Although Van Rensselaer originally received orders to call up 800 men, he decided to call out his
entire militia brigade instead. Gov. Clinton replied to a letter from Van Rensselaer on this
subject. “I . . . approve your ordering out your whole brigade. My orders of yesterday were for
800, but those of this morning were for your whole brigade. . . . hasten them on with all possible
speed, and take with them all the provisions that can be collected.”227 Unfortunately, the
provisions that Van Rensselaer was able to collect for the campaign were scanty at best.
Johnson’s expedition was now in a race against time, as they continued their march
toward the Schoharie. While on the march, a group of Seneca Indians captured a party of six
American scouts. These men gave Johnson specific information about the garrisons of the forts
in the Schoharie Valley. Using the captured scouts as guides, Johnson’s expedition reached the
Schoharie Creek on October 16th, where they made camp. On the morning of October 17,
Johnson’s men marched north past the Upper Fort.228 But a militiaman out driving loose cattle
into the fort saw the rear of Johnson’s expedition and raised the alarm.229 When Johnson heard
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the alarm, he gave an order for his men to plunder and burn their way north through the
Schoharie Valley. Johnson next attempted to capture Middle Fort,230 but discovered that his
small artillery piece and mortars were ineffective. Three times Johnson sent a white flag
demanding the fort’s surrender. Each time the garrison fired on the flag.231 Johnson’s men
burned everything outside of a fifty yard radius of the fort, and late in the afternoon moved on to
the north.232 After reaching the Lower Fort,233 Johnson’s artillerymen fired a couple of cannon
shots into the church tower, but otherwise left the fort alone. His men satisfied themselves with
killing and burning anything outside of a fifty yard radius of the fort. Johnson’s men encamped
for the night, a few miles downstream from the Lower Fort.
At the same time that Johnson’s force burned its way down the Schoharie toward the
Mohawk, General Robert Van Rensselaer worked tirelessly to gather a force to defeat Johnson.
Van Rensselaer wrote to Gov. Clinton,
I shall in an Hour or two, as nearly as I can estimate, have between 6 and 700 Men:
fifteen Head of Cattle intended for Fort Schuyler arrived here yesterday. I have
ordered six to be killed this Morning to victual the Troops for two Days, and as I shall
in all probability be necessitated to make use of the Rest and want an additional
Number . . . I shall immediate march to Fort Hunter and upon my Arrival take such
Measures as Circumstances will admit of to intercept the enemy’s Retreat.234
On October 18, while Van Rensselaer gathered men and supplies, Johnson’s men marched north
to Fort Hunter at the confluence of the Schoharie Creek and the Mohawk River. At Fort Hunter,
Johnson split his force into two parties that would destroy everything along both banks of the
230 Middle Fort was near the current town of Middleburgh, New York. This work was the next fortification
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231 James A. Roberts, ed.”Raid of Sir John Johnson, or the Schoharie and Mohawk Valleys, in October, 1780,” in
New York in the Revolution as Colony and State (Albany, New York: 1897), xiv.
232 Thomas, Sir John Johnson, 91.
233 The Lower Fort consisted of a stone church inside a stockade fence. This fortification was near the current city of
Schoharie, New York. The church, minus the stockade, still exists today as part of the Old Stone Fort Museum.
234 Brigadier General Robert Van Rensselaer to Governor George Clinton, October 18, 1780, in File HF167-I- 2
Montgomery County Department of History and Archives, Fonda, New York.
68
Mohawk west to Anthony’s Nose. Meanwhile, Gen. Van Rensselaer’s militia marched west to
stop Johnson. Major J. Lansing wrote the following from the drive to stop Johnson.
This Moment General Rensselaer is advised by express, that the enemy are burning
the country in the Neighbourhood of Fort Hunter. Their Force could not be ascertained
when the Man came away. Genl. Rensselaer intends to push on by Moon Light, as
soon as he possibly can; perhaps your Excellency may deem it advisable to order the
Militia now at Schenecyady to march up. . . .”235
Johnson’s men reached Anthony’s Nose236 at about midnight on October 19, where they
encamped for the night separated on opposite banks of the Mohawk River.
After delivering the information of Johnson’s coming raid to Albany on October 13
(three days before the enemy reached the Schoharie Valley), the garrison of Fort Stanwix did
nothing. It did not attempt to come to the aid of the settlements downriver although they had
several days to get into position. This was inexcusable as the mission of the garrison of Fort
Stanwix was to defend the Mohawk Valley. By not assisting the Levies and militia in the
Mohawk Valley in stopping the enemy at the Noses, the garrison missed an opportunity to
possibly defeat Johnson’s exhausted force. At very least the Levies and militia could have halted
Johnson until Van Rensselaer attacked him from the rear. The cooperation of all the military
units in the Mohawk Valley against the enemy would likely have prevented the destruction of the
Stone Arabia settlements.
Col. Brown of the Massachusetts Levies received word, at his headquarters in Fort Paris
in Stone Arabia, on October 18 from two enemy deserters that Johnson’s force was camped on
both banks of the Mohawk near the Noses due to exhaustion. Brown decided to attack the next
morning with all 360 of his men. By failing to attack the separated party on the north bank of the
235 Major J. Lansing, Jr. to Governor George Clinton, October 18, 1780,  in File HF167-I-2Montgomery County
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Mohawk, Brown lost an opportunity to knock out a large portion of Johnson’s force. Early the
next morning Johnson crossed the Mohawk River, reunited his command, and set up an
ambush.237 Brown and his men were led into the trap by a rider who claimed to carry orders from
Van Rensselaer. In the Battle of Stone Arabia, Brown and over thirty levies and militia were
killed. The remainder of Brown’s battalion fled.
At this time, Van Rensselaer’s men marched along the south bank of the Mohawk and
arrived within earshot of the battle. While looking for a suitable ford, Van Rensselaer received
word of the defeat of Brown. At this time Colonel Lewis Dubois’ New York Levies, Lt. Col.
Samuel Clyde’s Tryon County Militia, and Lt. Col. Louis Atayataghronghta’s fifty Oneida
warriors crossed the river. After crossing, they waited impatiently for Van Rensselaer and the
rest of the force to join them. The Albany County Militia had fallen behind, and Van Rensselaer
wanted them to catch up with his column before crossing the river. After crossing, Van
Rensselaer divided his force into three columns so that they would be in battle formation when
they met Johnson’s force.238
After defeating Brown, Johnson’s men proceeded to destroy the Stone Arabia
settlements. Johnson then turned his force west, leaving a swath of destruction from Stone
Arabia to Fox’s Mills, avoiding any fortified houses along the way.239 He knew that his column
had to move quickly due to the close proximity of Van Rensselaer’s forces to his position.
Johnson’s expedition now began to head west toward their boats in order to return to Oswego.
But, Van Rensselaer’s men arrived and met Johnson in battle before they could escape. During
the Battle of Klock’s Field, confusion ruled the day. The late hour that the battle was fought led
to the onset of darkness that, when combined with the thick gunsmoke, made it extremely
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difficult to distinguish friend from foe. Despite this, Van Rensselaer’s right wing broke through
Johnson’s left and began to work their way into his rear. Soon after this, reports of friendly fire
led Van Rensselaer to call back his men. Aided by Van Rensselaer’s unexpected retreat and the
cover of darkness, Johnson and his men escaped from the battle and headed toward their boats.
After the battle, Gov. Clinton, who now commanded the force pursuing Johnson, sent
word to Fort Stanwix to send a party out to destroy Johnson’s boats. This was to be done so that
the pursuit could capture Johnson before his command could return to Oswego. This attempt
failed with the capture of all but two of Captain Walter Vrooman’s party due to their
carelessness. If successful, the destruction of Johnson’s boats would have kept open the
possibility that Gov. Clinton’s and Van Rensselaer’s army could have finished the destruction of
the enemy. The failure of this mission squandered a golden opportunity for Fort Stanwix to slow
down Johnson’s retreat.
Capt. Walter Vrooman’s expedition failed nearly from the beginning. This failure
highlighted the personnel issues faced by the Fort Stanwix garrison in the fall of 1780. Many of
the NY Levies that garrisoned Fort Stanwix in the fall of 1780 were drawn from the regiment of
Col. John Harper. His unit had major discipline problems, including insubordination and
mutiny.240 Malcom had a very low opinion of Harper, writing that, “I might as well ask Col
Harpur about the day of Judgement as about his Regiment — I really have no patience to
mention instances of his Unofficer like cond[uc]t.”241 Malcom stated in an earlier letter that
“Gen’l Ranslaer will tell you that Harper is a blockhead.”242 These issues led him to place Major
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James Hughes in command of the troops going to Fort Stanwix in September 1780 rather than a
furloughed Col. Harper. Although these discipline problems existed prior to the NY Levies’
service at Fort Stanwix, they became acute as a result of the isolation and insufficient provisions
faced at the fort.
The personnel issues continued at Fort Stanwix even with Hughes in command during
September and October. After receiving word of Johnson’s coming raid, the men of the garrison
determined “if they came to attack the place they would not fight, and told their Officers They
would lay down their Arms as soon as They [Johnson’s force] would make their apperance.”243
While Johnson did not attack, or even go near Stanwix, this threat by the men highlighted the
fact that troops despised the rote monotony of service at the post. When the orders from Gov.
Clinton arrived to send out a party to destroy Johnson’s boats in order to prevent his escape,
Hughes sent Capt. Vrooman to lead it. Hughes ordered the party of sixty-one men to “Proceed by
the nearest Rout. to . . . gain the Front of the Enemy, retiring to Onondagoa  . . . interrupt their
March by harassing their Rear, Flank or Front . . . do not expose your Party to surprise, or
endanger them by being surrounded . . . you are then with the greatest Expedition to proceed to
that Place and destroy all their Boats, Baggage and Provision . . .”244 This was a golden
opportunity for Fort Stanwix to help defeat a major raiding party, but it was not to be.
While on the march, one of Vrooman’s men claimed he was “sick” and asked to be left
behind. After the remainder of the party marched on, the “sick” man walked several miles back
toward Fort Stanwix before Johnson’s raiders captured him. The man told Johnson everything
about the plan to harass his force and to destroy the boats. Johnson sent a force that surrounded
Vrooman’s command while they were carelessly eating a meal. In the ensuing ambush,
243 Abraham Fraser to Sir Frederick Haldimand, October 27, 1780, in Johnson, The Bloodied Mohawk, 173-174.
244 Major James Hughes to Captain Walter Vrooman, October 22, 1780, in ibid., 73-74.
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Johnson’s men captured fifty-six, killed two, and two escaped. Gov. Clinton discussed the
unverified preliminary reports of this to James Duane. “I am in great Hopes, however, that this
Account is not true as the Orders given to the Party by Maj’r Hughes was couched in the most
cautious Terms; they were to proceed with the greatest Circumspection & not to hazard and
Thing that might endanger their Retreat.”245 Vrooman’s force through their disobedience of
Hughes’ orders to remain vigilant in order to avoid capture, cost Fort Stanwix an opportunity to
stop, or at least slow down, Johnson’s force. The discipline problems that plagued Harper’s
Levies continued at Fort Stanwix, leading to this failure to capitalize on the intelligence about the
whereabouts of Johnson’s boats.
Johnson’s October 1780 raid devastated Tryon County.Many residents lost everything
but their lives. Christopher P. Yates wrote,
I imbrace this first Moment of Leisure to acquaint you that we are all safe and have
escaped the Burning — The Enemy crossed at Mort Van Alstines & stru ck off to
Stone Arabia . . . they have burned the greates[t] part of Stone Arabia & came out at
Waggoners, from there the burning continued up as far as Klocks . . .  The Enemy
were in our Pasture—we have lost one mare and one Milch Cow killed . . . The Night
when the enemy laid at the Nose [October 18] . . . at 12 OClock I got my wife &ca.
in a Waggon and brot them here [Fort Rensselaer] this Morning I sent her back. . .246
The destruction of the harvest had wide reaching repercussions on the army supply issues that in
turn made it even more difficult to provision Fort Stanwix. George Washington wrote to
Governor Clinton on the effect of the 1780 raids.
The damage, which has been done, will, I fear, be severely felt by the public as well as
by individuals. We had the most pleasing prospects of forming considerable
Magazines of bread, from the Country which has been laid waste, and which from
your Excellency’s letter, is so extensive, that I am apprehensive we shall be obliged to
bring flour from the Southward to support the troops at and near West Point. You will
be pleased to give me your opinion upon the quantity of flour that may yet, with
probability, be procured above, in the course of the Winter, that I may form some
245 Governor George Clinton to James Duane, October 29, 1780, in Public Papers of George Clinton, vol. 6, 347.
246 Christopher P. Yates to Henry Glen, October 21, 1780, in Johnson, The Bloodied Mohawk, 65-66. [Brackets
Mine].
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calculation of the quantity which it will be necessary to draw from Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Maryland.”247
The 1780 raids necessitated the fort’s draining of provisions from Washington’s meager supply
depots.
The enemy actions of 1780 on the New York Frontiers ravaged the Mohawk and
Schoharie Valleys. The large amount of destruction shocked and enraged Continental officers on
the scene, such as Colonel Udny Hay, who said that “the whole loss we have sustained is about
two hundred dwelling houses, a proportionable number of barns and out houses, with about two
hundred thousand bushels of grain of various sorts, and a hundred horses and oxen and about
forty men killd and as many perhaps taken Prisoners. . . .”248 The loss of the 1780 harvest alone
was devastating but without the farms, equipment, and draft animals necessary to produce future
crops, Tryon County’s agricultural output would be crippled for years. This led to reduced
available food supplies in New York with which it had to fill its military supply obligations.249
The inability of Fort Stanwix to defend New York’s western frontiers from loyalist and
Indian raids in 1780 led to the complete collapse of the State Supply System in New York. New
York State had relied on Tryon County’s 1780 wheat and grain crop to fulfill its obligations of
food for the army. After the three major raids on the Mohawk and Schoharie Valleys, New York
did not have the food supplies to fulfill its quota. Gov. Clinton wrote that
the whole of the valuable Settlem’t of Schoharie & a part of the settlement of
BallsTown & almost the w hole of the Intermediate County on both sides of the
Mohawk River from Fort Hunter to Fort Rensselaer at the upper end of Cannojoharie,
including the settlement of Stone Arabia are burnt & laid waste; on a moderate
Computation we have lost at least 150,000 bush’ls of wheat besides other Grain and
247 General George Washington to Governor George Clinton, November 6, 1780, in Public Papers of George
Clinton, vol. 6, 384.
248 Colonel Udny Hay to Major General Nathaniel Greene, October 26, 1780, in Richard K. Showman and Dennis
M. Conrad, Eds., The Papers of Nathaniel Greene, vol. 6, June 1, 1780-December 25, 1780. (Chapel Hill, North
Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 434.
249 Governor George Clinton to President of Congress Samuel Huntington, November 6, 1780, in Public Papers of
George Clinton, vol. 6, 390.
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forage & 200 Dwellings. Schenectady may now be said to become the limits of our
western Frontier, the first Object worth a new Enterprize.250
This was a legitimate concern, as there were few places left west of Schenectady in the Mohawk
Valley that were not already destroyed. Except for those settlers living in the various forts
scattered across the Mohawk Valley, Schenectady was the nearest civilization on the Mohawk
River to Fort Stanwix after the 1780 raids.
Fort Stanwix’s isolation, low provisions, morale, and the threat of Indian attacks
continued to make life miserable for the garrison. Malcom wrote, “I am this moment returned
from another excursion . . . The Garrison of Fort Scuyler was in distress by many circumstances
— it was absolutely necessary to Support it — With much trouble I have got Wisenfels
forwarded to the 1th of Janry. . .”251 Col. Frederick Weissenfels commanded the 4NY and
relieved the NY Levies at Fort Stanwix in November of 1780.252 Weissenfels discussed his
preparations to relieve Hughes and the Levies. “I schall march to Morrow, with the Provisions I
have been able to collect, and do my self the honor of Transmitting the State of the Garrison, by
Major Hughes.”253 The 4NY would garrison Fort Stanwix until January 1781 when it was
consolidated into the 2NY.
After the raids in the fall of 1780, there was a major push by both New York State and
Continental Army officials to get Stanwix resupplied before the winter made the roads
impassable and prevented water travel on the Mohawk River. Gov. Clinton worried after the
raids that if a proper amount of supplies could not be brought to the fort before winter the post
may have to be abandoned.
250 Governor George Clinton to James Duane, October 29, 1780, in Public Papers of George Clinton, vol. 6, 346.
251 Colonel William Malcom to Governor George Clinton, November 3, 1780, in Letters Composed by Colonel
William Malcom http://www.fort-plank.com/William_Malcoms_Letters.html (accessed on October 29, 2010).
252 Colonel Frederick Weissenfels to Governor George Clinton, November 15, 1780, in Public Papers of George
Clinton, vol. 6, 414.
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Colo. Weissenfels march’d to Schenectady where his Regt. Will continue to escort a
suff’t supply of Provisions to Fort Schuyler, a very inconsiderable Part of which is as
yet provided & unless particular attention is p aid to this Business (as the Season for
water Transportation in the course of a month will be over & it will be impossible to
forw’d it by Land), the Post must in the course of the winter be abandoned.254
Washington replied that he would send a supply of salted beef to Stanwix as soon as he received
it from Connecticut. He ordered the meat sped up, but it had not arrived as of his reply to
Clinton.255 Washington wrote to Governor Jonathan Trumbull of Connecticut, “I am in hopes
that the salted Beef which I requested your Excellency to forward, in my letter of the 28th
October has been sent on. Our dependence for a Winter Magazine for Fort Schuyler still rests
upon that parcel.”256 The Continental Army’s supply and transportation problems in late 1780
exacerbated the difficulties faced in keeping Fort Stanwix’s garrison fed and clothed.
New York had to scrounge for not only the provisions but also the transportation
necessary to resupply Fort Schuyler. Due to the distance between the supply depots and Fort
Stanwix and the danger of Indian attack along the route, resupply convoys were infrequent in late
1780 and early 1781. The state and garrison also dealt with corruption that manifested itself in
either poor quality supplies or theft of supplies between the depots and Fort Stanwix.
Weissenfels detailed the shortages faced by the garrison and how they were worsened by these
actions.
. . . I have taken notice, of a mode, verry Prejudicial to the Safety of this Post, to state
254 Governor George Clinton to General George Washington, October 30, 1780, in Public Papers of George Clinton,
vol. 6, 354-355.
255 General George Washington to Governor George Clinton, November 5, 1780, in Fitzpatrick, Writings of George
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the Supplies, by superficial Calculations as to both quantity and quality, when they
are sent of, from Schenectady, without considering the inevitable Casualties that may
happen to them, Witness the 60 Barrels of Flower, destined for Fort Schuyler, which
where left at Fort Herkema without guard or direction, who where nearly half
consumed, and the Rum half water. I have Experienced the random Calculations . . .
that instead of Provisions sufficient for Febr. this month will Finish the whole. . . .257
This type of corruption occurred throughout the war in the Continental Army, but the desperate
need of provisions throughout the Mohawk Valley after the 1780 raids led to its increase in the
supplies destined for Fort Stanwix.
This led to Washington again taking provisions from his army in order to supply Fort
Stanwix. Washington wrote in his diary on May 5, 1781 about his urgency in sending supplies to
Fort Schuyler.
Accounts from Brigadr. Genl. Clinton at Albany, . . . filled me with anxious fears that
the Garrison of fort Schuyler would be obliged to evacuate the Post for want of
Provisions . . . In consequence of this alarming information, I directed the Q. M. Gl.
To send 50 Barls. of flour and the like qty. of Salted Meat immy. up for the Garrison
of Fort Schuyler – but of the latter there being only 24 in Store, no more could be
sent.258
Washington, Gen. Clinton, and other officers continued to forward supplies at great cost of both
money and manpower, neither of which they could really afford, to provision Fort Stanwix, a
post that repeatedly proved its inability to defend the settlements from enemy raids in 1780.
The low morale and sometimes insubordinate actions of the NY Levies at Fort Stanwix
was of great concern to Gov. Clinton, as it was clear that the New York State troops did not want
to serve at the isolated frontier post. In his discussion of the October 1780 raid, Clinton wrote
that
The Levies incorporated in this Regt. whose Times expire ab’t the middle of
December, were immediately to march to Fort Herkimer to keep open the
257 Colonel Frederick Weissenfels to Governor George Clinton, December 4, 1780, in Public Papers of George
Clinton, vol. 6, 466.
258 George Washington, “May 5, 1781 Diary Entry” in The Diaries of George Washington, vol. 3, 1771-75, 1780-81
ed. Donald Jackson, and Dorothy Twohig (Charlottesville, Virginia: University Press of Virginia, 1978), 359.
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communication of Fort Schuyler with the Country. . . . I could have wished some
other Regt. Better provided ag’t the severe Climate had been ordered to garrison that
Post . . . because the Troops of this State conceive it an hardship constantly to
garrison it, this Duty is become extremely disagreeable to them.259
At the time of Gov. Clinton’s letter, the NY Levies at Fort Stanwix had barely been in garrison
for a month when they began clamoring for relief. In comparison, the 3NY remained in garrison
for twenty months260 before being relieved, the 1NY even longer.261 Washington stated in his
reply
I am very sorry that the troops of your State should look upon it as a hardship to do
the Garrison duty of Fort Schuyler. I had always allotted it to them, as thinking it
would be agreeable to both Officers and Men to guard their own Frontier, especially
when they are not continued an unreasonable time upon the tour. The Frontier posts
of Penna. and Virginia have been continuously garrisoned by their own Regs. which
have not been relieved these two years. The troops of the line in general are, in point
of Cloathing, upon a footing with the rest of the Army, which is very bare, and which
has a poor prospect of being well supplied.262
Washington’s placing New York regiments in garrison at Fort Stanwix was consistent with his
operations along the Pennsylvania and Virginia frontiers.263 The garrison of Stanwix, while it
faced supply problems, was no worse off than the rest of the Continental Army. Also, at times
due to the importance placed on the fort, it received supplies that Washington could ill afford to
send. While Stanwix’s isolation from settlements and the constant threat of Indian attack
undoubtedly had a major effect on the garrison’s dislike of the post, this circumstance most
259 Governor George Clinton to General George Washington, October 30, 1780, in Public Papers of George Clinton,
vol. 6, 355.
260 The 3NY served as garrison between April 1777 and December 1778.
261 The 1NY served as garrison between December 1778 and October 1780.
262 General George Washington to Governor George Clinton, November 5, 1780, in Fitzpatrick, Writings of George
Washington, vol. 20 http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/ot2www-
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likely came from the men not wanting to go to Fort Stanwix in the first place. Col. Malcom
discussed this and the consequences of sending short-term troops to Stanwix.264
On December 27, 1780, Lt. Col. Robert Cochran received orders from Gen. James
Clinton to escort provisions to Fort Stanwix, and then to relieve Weissenfels, who asked to be
relieved prior to the expiration of his commission. Gen. Clinton wrote that, “I have directed Lt.
Col. Cochran to take Command of Fort Schuyler, where I have this day sent fifty Barrels of
Flower, being all that I could collect. Col. Weissenfels is impatient to be relieved.”265 Col. Philip
Van Cortlandt would take command in late January 1781, temporarily relieving Cochran, after
guarding another supply convoy to Stanwix.266 Throughout the remainder of the time Fort
Stanwix was in use supply issues continued to plague the fort’s garrison.
Yet until forced to do so, New York State and Continental Army officials refused to
allow the garrison to move east to be closer to the settlements they were defending. This was due
to the belief that Fort Stanwix was the key to holding the Mohawk Valley and that as long as it
held the frontier as well as Schenectady and Albany could be defended from enemy attack. This
mindset began with the reconstruction of the fort in 1776 and was strengthened by the defeat of
the St. Leger Campaign at Stanwix in 1777. Meanwhile, the events of 1778 and 1780 completely
disproved this idea, as the majority of the raids avoided Fort Stanwix, and the fort was powerless
to stop the attacks that did come. Regardless, Washington and many other officers held this
mindset right up to the abandonment of Fort Stanwix in May 1781.
264 Colonel William Malcom to Governor George Clinton, September 16, 1780, in Letters Composed by Colonel
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265 Brigadier General James Clinton to Governor George Clinton, December 27, 1780, in Public Papers of George
Clinton, vol. 6, 525.
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The morale and discipline problems of the NY Levies carried over into Col. Philip Van
Cortlandt’s 2NY when it took over garrison duties in January of 1781. Some of the offenses
included cursing at superiors, guard duty infractions, and stealing, especially of food, among
many others.267 Enemy attacks, such as Joseph Brant’s March 1781 ambush of a woodcutting
party from Stanwix highlighted the reasons why the commanders of the fort were strict on
discipline.268 Enemy attacks, a lack of supplies, and low morale continued at Fort Stanwix until
its abandonment in May 1781. The combined effects of torrential rains, and a fire added to the
problem. Lt. Col. Cochran, again in command at Fort Stanwix, detailed the damages to the fort’s
sod walls from the rains.
. . . more than two thirds of the works broken down, Occationed by the late heavy
Rains, and assure that the remaining will be in the same Condition in a few days . . .
the Only Remaining strength, is the Outside Picquets on the glacis . . . an attempt of
Repairing the Works . . .being Oblig’d to Begin at the Foundation, and thereby Open
the remaining Part of the works which would prove Very dangerous in Case of an
Attack as No less than five or Six hundred Men, under the direction of an Engineer,
with a Sufficient Number of Artificers, Wagons, Tools, &c. would repair it, in the
course of the summer.269
Then, on May 14, much of the barracks inside the fort burned down in a fire of unknown
origin.270 This led to the garrison receiving orders to abandon Stanwix and move into Fort
Herkimer. The 2NY and all of its equipment were in Fort Herkimer and the surrounding posts by
June 11, 1781.271
The removal of the garrison from Fort Stanwix to Herkimer as happened after the
damages sustained by the fort in 1781 was not a new idea. In early October 1780, Col. Malcom
wrote to both Gov. Clinton and to Washington about the possibility of razing Fort Stanwix and
267 Gavin K. Watt, A Dirty, Trifling, Piece of Business, 78-79, 82.
268 Ibid., 85-86.
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moving the garrison east by about thirty miles to the edge of the settlements. He wrote to Gov.
Clinton, “Fort Scuyler in my opinion ought be destroyed, and the fort reestablished about one
mile above Fort Herkimer — we support that garrison at great Risque & expense — both
increasing — and it affords no kind of Safety to the Country — If you was here I am sure you
would see the propriety of this measure — I report this opinion to the General — I wish you to
take into Consideration[.]”272 In his reply to Malcom, Gen. Washington passed the idea on to
Gov. Clinton, as the latter knew the area and its situation better than he did.
I am not sufficiently acquainted with the situation of the County above to give an
opinion upon the propriety of evacuating Fort Schuyler and establishing a post lower
down. At any rate this could not be done before the new post was in sufficient
forwardness to receive the Garrison immediately upon the evacuation of the old, and
this, . . . would be a work of considerable time. It is a matter which will much depend
on the prevailing sentiment in the State, which is more immediately interested in the
measure, and as you have mentioned your opinion on the subject to His Excellency
the Governor, he will I imagine take the necessary steps to have the measure adopted
should it be deemed eligible.273
Washington here declined to make a decision on this issue as he claimed that he did not have
sufficient knowledge of the area or the situation to give an answer.274 He believed that the issue
could be better decided by those in New York who knew the Mohawk Valley and its situation
better than himself. Malcom’s proposition to demolish Fort Stanwix in favor of a position nearer
to the settlements was ultimately rejected. Many officials, both state and army, believed that Fort
272 Colonel William Malcom to Governor George Clinton, October 3, 1780, in Letters Composed by Colonel
William Malcom http://www.fort-plank.com/William_Malcoms_Letters.html (accessed on October 28, 2010).
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Stanwix was key to defending the Mohawk Valley until the fort’s destruction in May 1781.275
The problem with this school of thought was that the 1780 raids demonstrated the inability of
Fort Stanwix to halt the Loyalist and Indian raiding parties.
New York State and Continental Army officials rejected Malcom’s plan, as the prevailing
mindset was that if Fort Stanwix was abandoned or fell, the British would march right down the
Mohawk Valley to Albany. While during the 1777 St. Leger campaign this was true, after his
failure the British in Canada changed their strategy to one of using Loyalist and Indian raids to
fight the war in the Mohawk Valley. The Americans viewed Fort Stanwix as the key to
defending the back door to Albany placing great emphasis on keeping it manned and supplied.
But the Loyalists and Indians simply marched outside of its reach, devastating the Mohawk
Valley during their raids in 1778 and 1780. The raids on the Mohawk Valley in the summer and
fall of 1781, after the abandonment of Fort Stanwix, ultimately proved that the British were not
interested in marching a large army straight down the Mohawk Valley. These raids continued in
the same vein as those that occurred in 1778 and 1780. Malcom, in his short time in the Mohawk
Valley, could see the obvious. Fort Stanwix could not defend the valley against the enemy
raiders, and it was rapidly becoming a major waste of money, time, and effort to keep garrisoned.
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Conclusion
Fort Stanwix’s inability to properly defend New York’s western frontier from enemy
attacks, combined with the logistical problems in maintaining the post, demonstrated how the
fort became a liability to the Continental Army by 1780. Stanwix drained Continental Army
resources of food, finances, and manpower. Further, Fort Stanwix’s isolated position, the
constant threat of enemy attack, and the lack of provisions led the soldiers on the garrison to
despise serving at the post.
Fort Stanwix did have early success in its role of defending the Mohawk Valley.
Reconstruction of its works began in July 1776 and continued into 1777. The biggest success of
Fort Stanwix and its garrison was the defeat of British Lt. Col. Barry St. Leger who besieged the
fort in August 1777. The garrison at that time consisted of Col. Peter Gansevoort’s 3NY. The
Battle of Oriskany and the sortie of Lt. Col. Marinus Willett both of which occurred on August 6,
1777, heavily demoralized the Indians in St. Leger’s force. This demoralization led to the flight
of the enemy force, forcing St. Leger to abandon the siege when Benedict Arnold approached
with 1,000 Continentals.  This was the only instance where Fort Stanwix worked as planned in
its role of defending the Mohawk Valley.
Fort Stanwix also had some limited success through its relaying of intelligence received
from the Oneida Indians to officials at Albany and the other local frontier forts. In November
1778, Col. Gansevoort sent information he received from an Oneida on the coming raid against
Cherry Valley to Col. Ichabod Alden. This information helped to alert Mohawk Valley residents
and officials to coming raids. The April 1779 expedition of Col. Goose Van Schaick against the
Onondagas brought temporary respite from major raids to the residents of the Mohawk Valley.
Between 1777 and 1779 Fort Stanwix saw limited success in its mission to defend the western
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frontiers of New York. Despite these successes, many events that led to Stanwix becoming a
drain on the Continental Army would soon occur.
There were several main factors that led to Fort Stanwix becoming a liability to the
Continental Army. The first was the constant draw of provisions. Due to its isolated position,
Fort Stanwix was very difficult to keep supplied. This led to near constant shortages of food at
the fort, especially in 1780 and 1781. The distance between Fort Stanwix and the Continental
Army supply depots coupled with the substantial parties of guards needed to defend the
incoming convoys from attack led to the infrequent resupply of the fort. The 1780 raids that
destroyed the Mohawk valley grain harvest prevented sufficient provisioning of the Continental
Army and the forts such as Stanwix. Washington’s views on the importance of Fort Stanwix to
the defense of the Mohawk Valley led him to send whatever supplies he could. At times
Washington would send all the supplies he had on hand just to keep Fort Stanwix afloat.
The second factor was the mindset of many Continental Army officers and other officials
who believed that holding Fort Stanwix was the key to holding the Mohawk Valley. This
thinking was true in 1777 during the St. Leger campaign. But after St. Leger’s defeat at Stanwix,
the British changed their offensive strategy in the Mohawk Valley to one that let the Indians and
loyalists fight the war on their own terms. With the exception of Brant’s attack on the Oneidas
outside Fort Stanwix in July 1780, the raids of 1778 and 1780, took routes into the Mohawk
Valley that avoided the fort. The Americans could not see this change, and subsequently
continued to fight in the Mohawk Valley with a pre-1777 mindset that relied heavily on Fort
Stanwix.
The problems surrounding Fort Stanwix had a major effect on the manpower of the
garrison. These factors led to desertions and other discipline problems such as lax security on
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work details and blatant insubordination. These issues were a factor to all of the units that
garrisoned Fort Stanwix, but the better trained and motivated the men were prior to their service
at the fort, the longer it took for these problems to manifest themselves. In the case of the 3NY
and the 1NY it took several months or more at Stanwix for the discipline problems to appear. In
the case of the NY Levies, it took less than one month. Morale and discipline problems increased
among the Levies to the point that when the men heard of the incoming October raid, the men
stated that they would surrender if the enemy appeared.276 Due to these issues, Col. William
Malcom was not impressed with the quality or quantity of the Levies in Fort Stanwix.277 All of
these factors contributed to make Fort Stanwix a liability to the Continental Army, especially
after 1780.
After the destruction of the Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca Indian towns in 1779 in the
Van Schaick and Clinton-Sullivan Campaigns, it was only a matter of time before the Oneidas
felt the wrath of their British-allied neighbors for backing the Americans. This occurred when
Joseph Brant burned the Oneidas’ abandoned villages on July 26, 1780, after the Oneidas had
fled to Fort Stanwix. Brant followed them to the fields outside Stanwix where the majority of the
Oneidas rejected his offers and fled into the fort.  The enemy force began to trade fire with the
garrison until cannon fire drove them back.278 Brant, knowing that he had no chance of taking the
fort, marched toward Canajoharie. After this attack, Stanwix faced the now nearly complete
isolation of its position, except for the tenuous route along the Mohawk. This is the route the
supply wagon trains travelled, with large escorts due to the Indians that hid around the fort in the
forests. Brig. Gen. Robert Van Rensselaer’s use of the Tryon County Militia to guard the supply
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train to Stanwix on August 2 removed the defense of the Canajoharie District just prior to
Brant’s descent upon it.279 This raid of Joseph Brant on the Oneidas in July and Canajoharie in
August 1780 marked when Fort Stanwix became more of a liability than an asset to the
Continental Army.
The official thought among New York State and Continental Army officials was that Fort
Stanwix could not be abandoned or fall, lest the British conquer the Mohawk Valley. This is
evident through the continuance to of both New York and the army to funnel men and supplies
into a position that was nearly isolated. When the NY Levies took garrison there in September of
1780, Col. William Malcom made several observations that he sent on to Gov. Clinton
describing the realities of the situation in the Mohawk Valley. In some of his observations,
Malcom recommended the institution of martial law and the forced removal of loyalist families
from the area.280 He also argued that the frontiers could be defended if he had reliable officers
and enough provisions.281 After Sir John Johnson’s October 1780 campaign against the Mohawk
and Schoharie Valleys burned nearly all of Tryon County’s grain harvest, Fort Stanwix’s drain
on Washington’s Continental supply depots increased rapidly.
Washington still believed in May 1781 that “Rather than the Garrison of Fort Schuyler
should fall; and the Frontiers be again desolated and laid waste, I am persuaded the State will
make a great effort to afford a supply of flour for the troops in that quarter.”282 The problem with
this thinking was that the frontiers had already been destroyed in 1780, there was very little left
to destroy in 1781. Fort Stanwix repeatedly failed to do its job of defending the Mohawk Valley
279 Colonel Samuel Clyde to Governor George Clinton, August 8, 1780, in Johnson, The Bloodied Mohawk, 50-51.
280 Colonel William Malcom to Governor George Clinton, September 25, 1780, in Letters Composed by Colonel
William Malcom http://www.fort-plank.com/William_Malcoms_Letters.html (accessed on December 7, 2010).
281 Ibid. (accessed on December 7, 2010).
282 General George Washington to Brigadier General James Clinton, May 4, 1781, in Fitzpatrick, The Writings of
George Washington, vol. 22. http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/ot2www-
washington?specfile=/texts/english/washington/fitzpatrick/search/gw.o2w&act=text&offset=27261452&textreg=0&
query=Fort+Schuyler&id = (accessed on November 2, 2010).
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from enemy attack, yet state and army officials acted as if it succeeded. When New York could
not provide supplies, Washington sent them from his own army’s supplies at times sending all
that he had on hand in order to keep Stanwix fed.
The main reason that Fort Stanwix ultimately became a liability to the Continental Army
was its inability to stop the enemy raiding parties into the Mohawk and Schoharie Valleys. This
was due to the fort being constructed to prevent a force from advancing due east down the
Mohawk River. With the British strategy changing from conquering the Mohawk Valley to using
Indian and loyalist raids to destroy the agricultural output of the frontiers, Fort Stanwix was
unable to properly defend the territory. Fort Stanwix could not stop these destructive raids, as the
enemy could enter the frontier from any direction. Realizing this, Malcom made a controversial
request to both Washington and Gov. Clinton that Fort Stanwix be dismantled and the garrison
moved thirty miles east to the area near Fort Herkimer.283 Malcom’s recommendation was
deferred to Gov. Clinton by Washington, and nothing changed at Fort Stanwix until a flood and
fire forced its abandonment in May 1781.
The 1780 Loyalist and Indian raids on the Schoharie and Mohawk Valleys pushed Fort
Stanwix into becoming a liability to the Continental Army. Throughout this time keeping the fort
in provisions was a major undertaking that taxed the limited logistical structure of the
Continental Army. This led to a near constant lack of supplies and provisions at the fort. These
factors manifested themselves in 1778, and came to a head in 1780, when the inability of
Stanwix’s garrison to prevent or stop the enemy raids on the settlements led to the success of the
loyalist and Indian raids on the Mohawk and Schoharie Valleys in 1780.
283 Colonel William Malcom to Governor George Clinton, October 3, 1780, in Letters Composed by Colonel
William Malcom http://www.fort-plank.com/William_Malcoms_Letters.html (accessed on November 2, 2010).
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The inability of Fort Stanwix to stop the raids was exacerbated by the constant lack of
supplies and provisions that led to the post draining provisions away from Washington’s army
supply depots, at times taking all of the supplies that he had on hand. Yet, even when supplied,
Fort Stanwix was unable to stop the raids from destroying the frontier settlements between 1778
and1780. Through the unwillingness of officials to realize that their strategic viewpoint on the
war in the Mohawk Valley needed to change, Stanwix continued to drain away manpower,
foodstuffs, and other supplies from the Continental Army in order to keep up the post. Col.
Malcom was right; Fort Stanwix was a major drain on men, supplies, and money all of which
could possibly be utilized more effectively nearer to the settlements that it defended.
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